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THE MERCOSUR RICE ECONOMY
Ralph Bierlen, Eric J. Wailes and Gail L. Cramer
INTRODUCTION
here has been growing interest among nations in the western hemi-
sphere in preferential trading arrangements (Taylor et al., 1995; Schuh
and Junguita, 1993). Since 1990, 33 regional agreements have been regis-
tered with the World Trade Organization — the supranational organization that sets
the rules for international trade (Blandford, 1995). One of the most important of
these trading arrangements is the Mercado Comun del Sur (Common Market of the
South), commonly referred to by its acronym, the MERCOSUR. (See Table 1 for a
definition of acronyms and technical terms.) The MERCOSUR is a customs union
whose member nations are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and whose
economies account for over half of Latin America’s gross domestic product (GDP)1.
Chile joined as an associate member on October 1, 1996, and Bolivia is expected to
become an associate member in 19972.
Since 1991 regional integration and bilateral economic reforms have had major
impacts on MERCOSUR rice markets. Brazil, the largest rice consuming nation
T
1Forms of economic integration include free-trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic
unions. Free-trade members lower or eliminate tariffs and perhaps other trade barriers among themselves, but
each maintains its own trade policy toward non-members. A customs union is a trading arrangement in which
internal tariffs are lowered or removed and a common trade policy is maintained toward non-members. A
common market is a customs union in which factor markets such as labor, capital and enterprise are also
integrated. An economic union pushes integration substantially beyond that of a common market. Factor
markets and product markets are closely integrated as well as fiscal, monetary, taxation and social policies. As
nations move from free-trade areas to economic unions, national demarcations among members become
increasingly blurred.
2The most important impediments to Chile becoming a full MERCOSUR member were tariffs that were typically
lower than those of the MERCOSUR and its preferential trading arrangements with other nations. Under its
agreement with the MERCOSUR, Chile will retain its external tariff of 11% on imports from non-members and
will immediately place zero tariffs on 700 import categories from members. Gradual elimination of other tariffs
will take place over an 18-year period. An important aspect of the agreement is the physical integration
protocol, which will give the other MERCOSUR nations access to Chilean Pacific ports.




Asociación Cultivadores de Arroz Uruguayan Rice Growers Association. Represents the
interests of rice producers.
Amazon Basin Large upland production area in Brazil located west of
the Cerrado.
Banco de la Republica Uruguayan gov’t bank that lends to the private sector at
market intererst rates.
Blue Belle A U.S. high-quality long-grain indica rice variety. This and
similar varieties planted in Argentina and Uruguay.
Cerrado Large upland rice production area in Brazil that runs
north to south between the Amazon basin and the
Atlantic ocean.
CFP Brazil’s Commission of Production Finance. In charge of
gov’t credit to agriculture from 1943 to 1990.
Chui City in eastern Uruguay on Brazilian border. Major
crossing point for Uruguayan rice.
CIAT Center for International Tropical Agriculture located in
Cali, Columbia. Channels new rice varieties from IRRI to
national rice research programs in the MERCOSUR.
Comision Sectorial de Arroz Uruguayan Sectorial Rice Commission. Group composed
of growers, millers and gov’t that sets the national
seasonal average producer price.
CONAB The National Supply Company of Brazil. Manages the
price support program for rice, which includes substantial
storage.
Corrientes Several largest Argentinean rice-producing provinces
between the Paraná and Uruguayan rivers. Second
largest rice producer.
Double Carolina A double-width indica rice variety primarily grown and
consumed in Argentina. Has low yields and is slow to
mature.
EMBRAPA The Brazilian Institute for Agriculture Research. Federal
agency in charge of basic agricultural research.
Entre Rios Largest Argentinean rice-producing province between the
Paraná and Uruguay rivers.
Gremial de Molinos Arroceros Uruguay Rice Millers Association. Represents the
interest of millers.
Hidrovia The Paraná-Uruguay river system. Seen as backbone of
MERCOSUR transportation system.
INTA National Institute of Agricultural Technology. Primary
agricultural research arm of Argentinean government.
IRGA The Rio Grande do Sul Rice Institute. State institution
that is largest research institution for irrigated rice in
Brazil.
IRRI The International Rice Research Institute. Located in the
Phillipines, it is responsible for developing new rice
cultivars.
Junta de Granos The National Grain Board of Argentina. Prior to 1990s
regulated internal rice prices and exports.
MERCOSUR Customs union consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Paraguay and Uruguay.
NAFTA A free trade area consisting of Canada, Mexico and the
United States.
continued




PLE A 60-month running average wholesale trigger price for
Brazilian rice. If exceeded, stocks released.
Proarroz Commission for the Improvement of Rice Cultivation. A
non-profit mixed commission representing the
Argentinean rice industry.
Real Plan 1995 Brazilian economic plan that introduced a new
currency and reduced government expenditure.
Rio de la Plata An estuary on the Atlantic ocean between Argentina and
Uruguay formed by the Paraná and Uruguay rivers.
Rio Grande do Sul Southernmost state in Brazil that is the largest producer
of irrigated rice.
Saõ Paulo Largest city and deficit market for rice in Brazil.
Tipo 1 Brazilian grade of milled rice with 10% or less brokens.
Used as standard throughout MERCOSUR.
Tropical indica varieties High-yielding rice varieties planted throughout
MERCOSUR and primarily consumed in Brazil. Origi-
nated with IRRI.
Uruguayana City in southeastern Corrientes, Argentina, on Brazilian
border. Point through which bulk of rice crosses into
Brazil.
outside of Asia, was self-sufficient in rice until the early 1990s. In the 1990s, Brazil
has imported about 1 million metric tons (MT) annually3. In response to Brazilian
import demand, Argentina and Uruguay have doubled their production since 1990,
and they have the potential to produce substantially more.
Although intra-MERCOSUR trade has increased to 600,000 MT (about 4% of
world trade), little attention has been given to the emergence of MERCOSUR rice
markets because no import substitution has taken place. MERCOSUR exports out of
the region remain relatively unimportant when compared to the total world quantity
traded, and until the 1990s the region did not import substantial quantities of rice on
a regular basis. There are indications, however, that events in MERCOSUR rice
markets will have repercussions on international markets in 1996 and beyond. Be-
cause of drought and a reduction in area planted, Brazil imported 2 million MT in
1996. Estimates at planting indicate that Brazilian production will fall 8% in 1997 and
imports will be greater than those of 1996. Currently, Argentina and Uruguay are
able to supply less than half of Brazil’s import needs. This has opened up substantial
export opportunities to other suppliers that are likely to extend to at least 1998. In
addition, Argentina and Uruguay are desirous of diversifying their export markets
away from Brazil, and there are a number of factors that indicate that they will have
some degree of success in accomplishing this goal in the future.4
3Except where noted, imports and exports are on a milled basis. Production and yields are on a rough or unmilled
basis.
4See Bierlen et al. (1996b) for an extended discussion of this topic.
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In order for the United States and other exporters to successfully compete in the
Brazilian rice import market, and in non-MERCOSUR markets contested by Argen-
tina and Uruguay, they need a thorough understanding of the MERCOSUR rice
economy. Changes in the MERCOSUR rice economy are particularly relevant to U.S.
rice firms that export substantial quantities to Latin American markets, markets in
which Argentina and Uruguay are expected to increase their market shares. Current
information on the MERCOSUR rice economy is limited and typically not written in
English. This bulletin combines secondary data with information gathered from avail-
able Spanish and Portuguese language publications and personal interviews by the
authors in the region in May and June 1995 to create a unique, comprehensive
information source.
The purpose of the bulletin is to describe and analyze the current production,
marketing and policy structure of the MERCOSUR rice economy. Emphasis is placed
on the dynamics created by regional integration and unilateral national economic
reforms. The study begins with a brief background of national economic reforms and
regional integration. The following sections discuss MERCOSUR rice production,
marketing, trade, policy and research.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC REFORMS
Regional Integration
The MERCOSUR is the largest trade block in the western hemisphere after
NAFTA. Its development is viewed as a key step in the economic integration of the
western hemisphere, which is expected to be fully implemented early next century.
The MERCOSUR was created by the Treaty of Asunción in March 1991 with the
objective of establishing a customs union by January 1, 1995. Internal tariffs were
reduced to zero in a series of seven steps from December 31, 1991, to December
31, 1994. Common external tariffs were put into place on January 1, 1995. Cur-
rently, the average common external tariff is about 20% with zero tariffs on most
imports from MERCOSUR members. Zero tariffs will be phased in on about 1600
protected items, which account for 15% of intra-MERCOSUR trade.
Regional integration has three rationales: 1) development of a national strategy to
improve economies of scale and to make national industries more competitive in the
international market place, 2) increased regional security and consolidated democracy
and 3) increased bargaining power of individual nations in broader trade liberalization
negotiations (Manzetti, 1993; Taylor et al., 1995). More immediate rationales for
joining the MERCOSUR include: 1) Brazil’s expected ability to increase exports of
capital and consumer goods, 2) the expected ability of the other four nations to
immediately increase exports of agricultural products to Brazil and 3) the hope of the
non-Brazilian nations to strengthen their industrial sectors in order to compete with
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Brazilian goods in the future. Uruguay, in a key geographical position with good
natural harbors on the Rio de la Plata, hopes to develop itself as the regional
transportation and service center. Since Paraguay is the poorest MERCOSUR nation,
leaders feel that membership can only improve current economic conditions. Chile,
with the only Pacific Ocean ports in the region, is a key link in the MERCOSUR
transportation system. The success of MERCOSUR hinges on real economic growth
in Brazil. Also, because neither Argentina not Brazil has a strong currency, consider-
able exporting will have to be done outside of the region in order to obtain hard
currency.
The MERCOSUR (not including Chile) has a land area of 4.5 million square miles
(about 123% of that of the United States) and a population of 203 million (about 77%
of that of the United States) (Table 2). Argentina accounts for 23% of the area and
17% of the population while Brazil accounts for 72% of the area and 80% of the
population. The other two nations account for 5% of the area and 3% of the
population. Over three-quarters of MERCOSUR citizens are urban dwellers, and
Table 2. Summary of MERCOSUR population and economic statistics.
Characteristic Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSURa Chile
Land Areab 1056.6 3265.1 153.4 67.5 4542.7 289.1
Populationc 34.7 160.5 5.0 3.2 203.4 14.5
Densityd 33 49 32 47 42 50
Population Growthe 1.2 1.7 2.8 0.8 1.6g 1.6
Urban Populatione 87 76 50 90 78g 85
Life expectancyf 72 66 69 73 68g 72
GDPh 279.5 540.9 8.8 11.0 840.3 65.6
GDP/Capitai 8054 3370 1753 3450 4131 4525
Exportsj 21.0 46.5 0.8 1.9 70.2 16.0
Imports,cifj 20.1 53.8 2.4 2.6 78.9 15.9
Exchange Ratek 1.000 1.013 2082.8 7.940 - 410.7
Annual Inflationl -2.0 162 10.2 26.3 10.1m 8.0
aIncludes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
bThousands of square miles
cMillions (1996)
dPersons per square mile (1996)
ePercentage (1996)
fYears at birth (1996)
gCalculated by using the population of each country to total MERCOSUR population as weights (1996)
hGDP = Gross Domestic Product (a measure of national output) = Billions of U.S.$ (1995)
iU.S.$ (1995)
jBillions of U.S.$ (1995)
kLocal currency per U.S.$ (August 1996)
lPercentage (second quarter 1996)
mCalculated by using the GNP of each country to total MERCOSUR GNP as weights (1995)
Source: Population Reference Bureau and International Monetary Fund.
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population growth rate in the region averages 1.9% annually. Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in the region was $840.3 billion in 1995, about 12% of that of the United
States. Brazil accounts for 64% and Argentina 33% of the region’s GDP, while
Paraguay and Uruguay each account for around 1%. In 1995, per capita income was
highest in Argentina ($8,054), followed by Uruguay ($3,450), Brazil ($3,370) and
Paraguay ($1,753). In 1995, exports were valued at $70.2 billion and imports at
$78.9 billion. Only Argentina ran a small trade surplus, while Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay ran deficits. Over the past five years, intra-MERCOSUR trade has tripled and
in 1995 was $25 billion (imports and exports). Second-quarter 1996 inflation ran at
an annual rate of 10.1% in the region. Inflation ranged from -2% in Argentina to
26.3% in Uruguay.
National Economic Reforms
Unilateral national economic reforms, most prominently by Argentina and Brazil,
have paralleled regional integration. Due to a policy of economic reforms, begun by
the Menem administration in 1991, the business environment in Argentina is optimis-
tic for the first time in more than a generation. Specific reform measures include fiscal
responsibility, tariff reduction, privatization and deregulation. The Law of Convertibil-
ity has closely tied the peso to the dollar, thus limiting the growth in the money
supply and making budget deficits virtually impossible. Currently, inflation is down to
a single digit, and privatization is largely complete at the federal level and has begun
at the provincial level. Although having run a trade deficit in recent years, Argentina
had a merchandise trade surplus of $844 million in 1995 fueled by strong agricultural
export sales.
Although lagging Argentina’s reforms, Brazil’s economic reforms have recently
overshadowed those of Argentina due to its large economy (the largest in Latin
America and the tenth largest in the world). Brazil’s reforms date from July 1, 1994,
when the then-finance-minister and current president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
implemented the Real Plan. Important features of the Real Plan were a sharp
reduction in government expenditures and the introduction of a new currency, the
real, which was closely tied to the dollar. A new currency was necessary due to the
triple-digit inflation of the early 1990s. An immediate effect of the Real Plan was a
sharp reduction in inflation, which was running at 40% a month in the first two
quarters of 1994 and dropped to 0.91% a month in the fourth quarter of 1995.
Other effects of the Real Plan were increased income or economic growth to 5%, a
more than doubling of foreign investment from $1.5 billion in 1994 to $3.5 billion in
1995 and real wage increases. Strong economic growth and an overvalued real,
however, resulted in a trade deficit of $7.3 billion in 1995. In order to cool down an
overheated economy, the central bank increased reserve requirements early in 1995.
In spite of fears that Brazil was headed for a recession similar to that of Mexico and
Argentina in 1995, optimism is strong that rapid growth will continue into the next
century and that Brazil will fulfill its role as the MERCOSUR’s engine of growth.
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Uruguay has generally avoided the economic crises and the resulting austere
economic plans of Argentina and Brazil. Over the past decade, it has gradually
privatized and reduced inflation, tariffs and budget deficit levels. Inflation has steadily
declined from 112% in 1990 to a 23.5% annual rate in the first half of 1996.
Although there has been some success in reducing the budget deficit, trade balances
have been negative since 1990. In 1993 the trade deficit was $680 million and grew
to $873 million in 1994. This fell slightly to $750 million in 1995. In 1994 about 8%
and in 1995 about 10.5% of the government budget was debt-financed. Budget
deficits are related to a liberal social security system that accounts for 37% of govern-
ment expenditures. In 1995, however, the Uruguayan Congress passed legislation to
reduce social security transfer payments to future beneficiaries. Although recent ad-
ministrations have tried to reduce the government’s role in the economy, a December
1992 referendum rejected large-scale privatization. In spite of the outcome of the
referendum, economic liberalization continues to be a long-term government goal.
RICE PRODUCTION SECTOR
Brazil is the ninth largest rice producer in the world and the second largest
importer after Japan. Argentina is the 25th largest producer and the ninth largest
exporter. Uruguay is the 26th largest producer and the eighth largest exporter. The
MERCOSUR produces substantial quantities of both irrigated and upland rice.5 Irri-
gated production is located in a contiguous area between 30 and 35 degrees south,
which includes the southernmost states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina in
Brazil, an area north and northwest of Buenos Aires in Argentina, primarily in the
provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes, and the eastern and northern departments
(akin to states) of Uruguay (see Fig. 1). Upland rice (non-irrigated) is grown in most
states of Brazil except for Rio Grande do Sul, the northeast and parts of the Amazon
basin. There is no upland rice production in either Argentina or Uruguay. Brazilian
upland production is located in two major regions: the deficient rainfall region (Cerrado)
and the adequate rainfall region (Amazon basin). The Cerrado is an extensive area
that runs north to south between the Amazon Basin and the Atlantic coastal plain and
includes all or parts of the states of Bahia, Tocantis, Piaui, Maranhão, Minas Gerais,
Saõ Paulo, Goias, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. The Amazon basin is
located west of the Cerrado and includes all or parts of the states of Mato Grosso,
Rondonia, Maranhão, Para, Amapa, Rondonia, Amazonas and Acre.
5Paraguay and Chile are not included in the discussion. Paraguay and Chile are small producers relative to the
other three nations (100,000 MT), and their international trade in rice is relatively unimportant.
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Fig. 1. 1994/95 MERCOSUR rice production by country and state (in metric tons).
(Source: Sparks American del Sur, Comision Sectorial del Arroz, IBGE, 1995)
Irrigated Production Sector
Irrigated rice production uses modern inputs and cultural methods. Average
yields are in excess of 5 MT/ha. Farm size varies, but the majority of rice is produced
on farms with more than 200 ha of rice. Large operations tend to be vertically
integrated with milling. There are over 12,000 irrigated rice producers in Brazil, over
800 in Argentina and 730 in Uruguay. Land is well suited to rice production because
it is flat and relatively impermeable and has a good supply of surface water. Livestock
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grazing is generally the only competing enterprise. Rice is typically produced for two
years followed by four years of livestock grazing. Recently, however, producers have
attempted to intensify the production of rice within this rotation. Santa Catarina and
northern Rio Grande do Sul are the only areas where two crops of rice can be
produced per crop year.
The first step in preparing for planting is construction of an internal drainage
system in the late fall and winter months (May through September).6 This is followed
by discing and leveling. Plowing is performed as needed in order to break up the
hardpan created by continual flooding. Seedbeds are prepared just prior to planting,
which is performed on the ground by broadcasting or by planting in rows in October,
November and early December. Currently, pre-germinated seed is the newest techno-
logical innovation being adopted. Shortly after planting, in preparation for flooding,
the internal levee system is constructed. Herbicide is applied (generally just once) 20
to 25 days after seeding and urea 40 days after seeding (during tillering) by air. The
field is flushed once or twice after the urea application in order to aid the young plant
in recovering from the herbicide application and to break the soil crust. The field is
flooded to a depth of 10 to 15 cm 45 days after emergence; about 10 million liters of
water/ha are needed. Urea is applied a second time to fields with low fertility levels
60 to 70 days after seeding. Fields are drained about 20 to 30 days before harvest.
Harvest begins in the northern interior zones of Brazil and Argentina in late January
or early February and finishes in eastern Uruguay and southern Argentina in May.
Typically, there are 100 days of the year with measurable precipitation, with
those days concentrated in the fall and spring. Excessive rain in the spring can delay
planting and cause flowering to occur in periods of cooler temperatures, resulting in
lower yields and higher incidences of blanking. Cool flowering days are particularly a
problem in eastern Uruguay, southern Entre Rios and southeastern Rio Grande do
Sul. In order to speed up planting and avoid cooler temperatures, no-till planting has
been increasingly adopted. Another advantage of the no-till method is that levees do
not have to be rebuilt each year.
Seed variety selection is another method of reducing problems related to cool
flowering temperatures. Blue Belle and similar varieties, which previously accounted
for the bulk of production and are still important in Argentina and Uruguay, perform
well in cool flowering temperatures. As a result, Blue Belle production dominates in
southern Entre Rios and eastern Uruguay. Currently, Blue Belle comprises 42% of
acres planted in Uruguay and 30% in Argentina. Blue Belle production is unimportant
in Brazil. Although Blue Belle is better tasting and has higher milling yields, producers
6The reader should keep in mind that the four seasons in the southern hemisphere are just the opposite of those
in the northern hemisphere.
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prefer domestically bred tropical varieties because they are higher yielding and Blue
Belle price premiums typically do not compensate for their lower yields. Because
tropical indica varieties grow numerous tillers, yields tend to be high, even when plant
populations are relatively sparse. Because of the tradeoff between production yields
on the one hand and quality and milling yield on the other, current varietal improve-
ment research in Argentina and Uruguay is focused on increasing the yields of
varieties similar to Blue Belle.
Except for small quantities of medium- and short-grain rice produced for the
Brazilian-Asian community, long-grain rice dominates irrigated production. About one-
fifth of Argentinean production is double-long-grain rice (double Carolina or Risotto),
which is referred to locally as Fortuna or Yeruá, and is preferred by high-income
domestic consumers. Previous to their integration into the European Union (EU),
Argentina exported double-long-grain rice to Spain, Portugal and Italy. In 1994/95,
about 2% of Uruguayan area was planted to a double-long-grain known as EEA-404,
which is largely marketed in Sao Paulõ. Double-long-grain plants are taller than fine
long-grain plants, are more blast susceptible, have yields 1 to 2 MT/ha lower than
fine long-grain and need 30 additional growing days.
The irrigated zone has abundant supplies of surface water. Major sources of
surface water include the Paraná and Uruguay rivers in Argentina; the Uruguay, Rio
Negro and Cuareim rivers and Laguna Marin in Uruguay; and the Uruguay river and
Laguna de Los Patos in Brazil. Except for deep-well pumping in the southern two-
thirds of Entre Rios, irrigation water is predominantly taken from surface sources and
is sustainable in the long run. Uruguay is the only nation with large irrigation systems,
usually owned by one or more mills, that provide water to multiple production units.
Uruguayan mills control about 60% of the surface water rights in rice production
areas. In order to purchase water from these mill-controlled irrigation systems, pro-
ducers must agree to market their rice to them. Although somewhat inefficient due to
overlapping systems in some areas, milled-controlled irrigation is the dominant system
in the eastern region of the country. There are several examples in which Uruguayan
mills jointly own and operate irrigation systems under a separate corporate entity. In
Brazil, Argentina and northern Uruguay, irrigation systems are decentralized and farm
specific.
In Entre Rios, a typical deep well irrigates 60 ha and the pumping rate is 60 to
80 liters/second. The diesel fuel (550 liters/ha) consumed by pump engines is a
significant production cost. Due to increased pumping, the water table is estimated to
have dropped 9 m in recent years. In the long run, surface water, the availability of
which is ample, will likely replace subsurface water in southern Entre Rios. In Rio
Grande do Sul, about 32% of the land is irrigated with the use of diesel-powered
pumps, 25% with electric-powered pumps and 43% by gravity flow. About 60% of
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Uruguayan irrigation water is taken from rivers and lakes and 40% from reservoirs.
About 45% of the water is extracted by gravity, and 55% is extracted with the aid of
pumps.
Currently, rice production in Corrientes and northern Entre Rios, where rice area
is expanding, is located where surface water can be readily accessed, i.e., near the
Uruguay and Paraná rivers. Large farms tend to be concentrated along the Paraná
and Uruguay rivers, from which they obtain their irrigation water, while smaller farms
use lagoons and streams as their source of irrigation water. Additional investment in
irrigation infrastructure is needed before planted area can be significantly increased in
these areas.
Land leasing and/or purchasing water is pervasive. Payment is typically in the
form of rough rice. In Rio Grande do Sul 65% of operators lease land. In 1993, land
rent averaged about 16.5 bags (50 kg each) of rough rice (15.3% of production)/ha.
Per-hectare water costs were similar to those for land. When both land and water
were provided, costs were 26.5 bags (25.5% of production)/ha. In Corrientes, about
80% of producers lease land, paying from 12 to 16% of their production. Leases in
Corrientes tend to be three-year verbal agreements. About 70% of producers lease
land in Entre Rios where typical rent is 16 bags/ha. In Uruguay, where 70% of
operators lease, land rent is 8 to 10 bags/ha. The water necessary to irrigate 1 ha
sells for 12 to 20 bags, with prices varying according to field accessibility.
Farm size varies. In Rio Grande do Sul, 80% of farms operate less than 100 ha,
and only 3% operate in excess of 400 ha, with the average farm operating 145 ha.
However, the 20% of farms operating more than 100 ha account for 70% of produc-
tion, and the 3% of farms operating in excess of 400 ha account for 27% of
production. Rio Grande do Sul tenants tend to have larger operations than owner-
operators. Tenant operations account for only 44% of farms with less than 100 ha
but 64% of those with more than 100 ha. Leasing in the state is becoming increas-
ingly dominant.
In Entre Rios 58% of production is from farms operating less than 100 ha, 34%
from farms operating between 100 and 200 ha and 8% from farms operating more
than 200 ha. Farm size tends to be larger in northern Entre Rios and Corrientes. In
Corrientes, approximately 40% of farms operate less than 200 ha, 32% between 200
and 400 ha and 28% over 400 ha. Farm size and tenancy are related; 50% of tenants
operate less than 200 ha and 85% less than 400 ha, while 80% of owner-operators
operate more than 400 ha. The average farm size in Uruguay is 166 ha with size
varying by department. Farms in the eastern departments of Treinta y Tres and Cerro
Largo have average farm sizes of 316 ha, while those in the other departments
average between 91 and 144 ha.
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Brazilian Upland Production
Upland rice is totally rainfall dependent and is produced by farmers who typically
operate fewer hectares, use more traditional inputs and cultivation methods and are
more diversified than their irrigated counterparts. Important crops that compete with
upland rice include wheat, soybeans, corn and sorghum.
 Prior to the mid-1980s, upland rice grew in importance due to its use as a good
initial crop on the agricultural frontier and government incentives to increase planted
area. Because yields decline in the frontier areas after one to three years of produc-
tion, rice is typically followed by the production of livestock or other crops. The
development of a soybean variety that has been successful as an initial crop and
recent government programs that have emphasized efficiency and markets over planted
area have reduced the importance of rice in the agricultural frontier regions.
 Upland rice varieties are generally taller than irrigated varieties and, therefore,
are more susceptible to lodging. If there is insufficient moisture at emergence, the
plant will weaken and lodge. Upland rice is also highly susceptible to blast due to high
humidity levels. In the Amazon basin the probability of adequate rainfall is greater
than 70% while in the Cerrado it is less than 70%. The probability of receiving
adequate rainfall generally increases from east to west. Because of these problems,
average yields, at just above 1.5 MT/ha, are less than one-third of irrigated yields and
are highly variable from year to year. Production could be doubled or tripled with
adequate and timely rainfall and the proper use of fertilizer, pesticides, plant spacing
and improved seeds. With pivot irrigation, upland rice has had yields as high as 5
MT/ha.
The Cerrado production area is flat to smoothly undulating, ideal for mechanized
agriculture. Soils range from sand to heavy clay with medium to heavy clay soils
predominating. Soils are normally well-drained with naturally low fertility. The climate
is tropical, with a temperature range between 0 and 40o C and an average tempera-
ture of 22o C. Rainfall averages 1200 mm annually with a dry season between April
and September. Summer droughts, which are frequent, are intensified due to the low
absorption qualities of soils. As in the Amazon basin, rice plays the role of a good
initial crop in the agricultural frontier zones. The Cerrado has a number of advantages
over the Amazon Basin: 1) a number of population centers in Brasilia, Goiania and
Campo Grande, 2) closer proximity to major consumption points in the Southeast
and 3) a better transportation system.
In the Cerrado, rice is typically produced for three years before rotating to other
crops or grazing cattle. In Mato Grosso rice has begun to be rotated with corn and
soybeans, and in Goias rice is intercropped with pasture. Rainfall variability, particu-
larly its distribution in critical growth periods, is the principal production risk. Inad-
equate moisture, however, can be minimized with the application of technologies that
seek to increase the availability of water, e.g., reducing unnecessary compaction and
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avoiding the overlapping of critical growth periods and low rainfall. Generally, mecha-
nization levels are high, but producers have poor managerial skills and technical
knowledge. Drying is typically performed in the field on small farms and mechanically
on large farms. The use of fertilizer, weed control and phytosanitary measures are
generally deficient. Access to credit, however, is generally adequate. The highest
technological levels are found in Mato Grosso and Maranhão. Farms that operate
more than 100 ha are common, and farms that operate more than 1000 ha predomi-
nate in Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. Leasing is pervasive throughout the
region.
The Amazon basin production region has a tropical climate with a one- to three-
month dry period. The land ranges from flat to gently rolling hills with diversified soil
types. Current yields are low, but when input levels are increased, yields do respond.
There are three production systems in the Amazon basin: intercropping, mechanized
and manual. Under the first system, which is largely practiced on 600,000 ha in the
northern state of Maranhão, rice is intercropped with corn and manioc on small
subsistence plots of around 2 ha. Rice is produced for a couple of years and then
abandoned for five to six years before being replanted. Rice is manually harvested and
field dried.
The mechanized upland production system is located in the states of Rondonia,
Maranhão and northern Mato Grosso where farmers typically operate more than 20
ha, have access to production loans and have good management skills and mechani-
zation levels. Plowing is the initial step in land preparation, and soil conservation
methods are generally ignored. Planting is performed at the beginning of the rainy
season. The use of purchased seed is low, but the use of recommended seed is high.
Fertilization is performed at less than optimal levels, weeds are controlled by herbi-
cides, and the treatment of seeds with insecticide is common. Harvesting and drying
are mechanically performed.
A shifting rice production system is practiced in the states of Rondonia, Acre and
Mato Grosso (along the border with Peru and Bolivia). Although farms typically
operate less than 4 ha, they are market oriented. Planting, hoeing and harvesting are
manually performed. There is no use of fertilizer or phytosanitary measures. Harvest-
ing includes cutting, shocking, thrashing, cooling and bagging.
Area Trends
It is estimated that 4.2 million ha of rice will be planted in the 1996/97 crop
year in the MERCOSUR: 1.1 million irrigated and 3.1 million upland (MERCOARROZ,
October 17 and November 4, 1996).7 In 1993/94, Brazilian irrigated area peaked at
1.1 million ha, up from less than 400,000 ha in 1960/61 (see Fig. 2). Brazilian
7For area, yield and production by state and department, see Table 3. This is the most recent year for which
the data is available.
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Table 3. MERCOSUR rice area, yield and production, 1994/95.
Harvested area Yield Production
Country/State (000’s ha) (kg/ha) (000’s MT)
Brazil 4300(-520)a 2235(416) 9612(847)
North Region 519(229) 1598(226) 829(432)
Rondonia 12(2) 2020(406) 24(8)
Amazonas 4(1) 1160(160) 5(2)
Amapa 1(0) 900(-213) 1(0)
Para 114(16) 1250(-71) 143(13)
Acre 26(3) 1500(301) 39(12)
Rondonia 112(-43) 1680(257) 188(-32)
Tocantis 250(N.A.)b 1720(N.A.) 430(N.A.)
Northeast Region 1275(311) 1439(307) 1835(729)
Maranhão 825(183) 1330(388) 1097(492)
Piaui 232(24) 1520(275) 353(94)
Ceara 61(36) 2250(-65) 137(51)
Rio Grande del Norte 8(0) 1410(275) 11(2)
Paraiba 14(5) 1630(41) 23(8)
Pernambuco 10(4) 3680(225) 37(17)
Alagoas 10(4) 3320(492) 33(15)
Sergipe 10(0) 3380(630) 34(6)
Bahia 105(55) 1050(270) 110(44)
Southeast Region 636(-301) 1853(-241) 1179(-332)
Minas Gerais 395(-169) 1700(250) 672(-146)
Espiritu Santo 35(0) 3080(377) 108(13)
Rio de Janeiro 11(-21) 3500(301) 39(-64)
Saõ Paulo 195(-111) 1850(232) 361(-134)
West Central Region 840(-707) 1526(288) 1282(-632)
Mato Grosso 340(-97) 1450(290) 493(-14)
Mato Grosso do Sul 120(-122) 1800(498) 216(-99)
Goias 375(-486) 1510(251) (-518)
Federal District 5(-2) 1330(118) 7(-1)
Southern Region 1030(-39) 4356(767) 4486(649)
Paraná 155(-45) 1725(285) 267(-21)
Santa Catarina 130(-14) 3800(786) 494(60)
Rio Grande do Sul 745(20) 5200(703) 3874(610)
Argentina 181(72) 5113(1573) 942(493)
Corrientes 61(7) 4900(1719) 297(130)
Entre Rios 99(58) 5473(911) 541(356)
Formosa 9(6) 5200(2277) 46(38)
Santa Fe 10(1) 4354(1254) 42(14)
Uruguay 146(61) 5500(434) 804(374)
Artigas 12 5809 67
Cerro Largo 24 5460 130
Lavalleja 4 5247 21
Rivera 6 5219 29
Rocha 20 4675 93
Tacuarembo 6 6372 36
Treinta y Tres 38 5869 222
aNumber in parentheses is the change in production from 1984/85
bN.A. Data for the state of Tocantis was not available until 1987/88 production year
Source: Sparks America del Sur (May 1995), MERCOARROZ  (August 28,1995) and Comision Sectorial de
Arroz, 1995.
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irrigated area has steadily fallen from the 1.1 million ha peak to an estimated 760,000
ha in 1996/97. Changes in Brazilian irrigated area have been fueled by changes in
production cost, population growth, consumer tastes, credit availability and price
support levels. Rio Grande do Sul has about 53,000 km2 of potential rice area, only
about 15% or 750,000 ha of which is currently planted in rice. The limiting factor to
increasing rice area is water and credit availability, low market prices (high costs
relative to Argentina and Uruguay), disease problems and diseconomies of scale.
Another limiting factor, and one that is common to Argentina and Uruguay as well, is
a rotation practice in which rice is produced in only one out of three years. Currently,
this is felt to be necessary due to the disease and pests associated with continuous rice
production.
Argentinean planted area has gone from less than 50,000 ha in 1960/61 to an
estimated 224,000 ha in 1996/97. Historically, area expansion has been dependent
on a slowly growing domestic population. Recently, however, Argentinean area has
grown significantly due to preferential access to the large Brazilian import market and
the discontinuance of export taxes. Factors limiting Argentinean production are flood-
ing problems in Corrientes and inadequate irrigation infrastructure. A major impedi-
ment to investment in irrigation is an inadequate supply of credit. If these problems
are corrected, Argentina could plant more than 500,000 ha. Uruguayan area has
grown from less than 50,000 ha in 1960/61 to an estimated 155,000 in 1996/97.
Fig. 2. MERCOSUR planted rice area (000’s ha, 1960/61-1996/97). Source: See Fig. 3.
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Like Argentina, the past two years have seen a record number of hectares planted.
The limiting factor to increasing area is inadequate supplies of irrigation water. With
sufficient irrigation water, Uruguay could increase production another 50,000 to
200,000 ha. Additional water could be taken from the Laguna Marin if the necessary
infrastructure were available.
Brazilian upland area began at just under 3 million ha in 1960/61. It peaked at
just over 6 million ha in the mid-1980s and in 1996/97 is expected to fall to 3.1
million ha. Most of the decline in area has occurred in the West Central states
(Cerrado) of Goias, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul due to 1) lower govern-
ment (the main buyer in the area) support levels, 2) a shift in policy, which has
emphasized higher-yielding (over area-intensive) production systems, 3) declining ac-
ceptance of upland rice (low quality) in urban areas, 4) a disappearing agricultural
frontier and 5) increasing competition from corn, wheat and soybeans. While upland
rice production has declined, corn production has grown 75% and soybean produc-
tion 88% over the past ten years.
Trends in Yield
Irrigated and upland yields have had distinct histories. Not surprisingly, irrigated
yields in the three countries have followed one another closely over the past 35 years
(see Fig. 3). With technology adoption, irrigated yields have steadily increased from
about 3 MT/ha in 1960/61 to over 5 MT/ha in 1995/96. The latter is just below
current U.S. long-grain yields of about 6 MT/ha. While Brazil had an annual com-
pound yield growth rate over the period of 1.90%, rates for Argentina and Uruguay
were lower at 1.04% and 1.15%, respectively. Some production units in Argentina
claimed yields of up to 8 MT/ha in 1994/95 and of up to 10 MT/ha in Uruguay in
1995/96. Upland yields, with an annual compound yield growth rate of only 0.33%,
have increased only marginally since 1960/61 (being just about 1.7 MT /ha in 1995/
96) due to 1) lack of appropriate technology, 2) inadequate financing, 3) a weak
producer co-operative movement, 4) diseconomies of scale and 5) inability to solve
lodging problems.
The 1995/96 production year began with low levels of available irrigation water
in Entre Rios and southern Corrientes. However, favorable rainfall in the last weeks of
October, rising prices and producer knowledge of low planting levels in Rio Grande
do Sul boosted planting levels. By December the water situation became grave again,
and many producers were unable to flood their previously planted fields. By the end
of December, there was a 300-mm precipitation deficit, and dams held only 50 to
70% of their normal levels. December and January rains helped to save the situation
to some extent. Due to the drought, 26,870 ha, or about 13% of planted area, was
not harvested (MERCOARROZ, May 30, 1996). While yields on harvested area were
5.1 MT/ha, they were 4.6 MT/planted ha. Lack of precipitation in November and
December in Rio Grande do Sul reduced potential production levels 18%. In Rio
Grande do Sul, precipitation levels were only 40% of normal in April to November
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and only 25% in December. January rainfalls helped to alleviate the situation, how-
ever. Rio do Grande do Sul 1996 yields were expected to be down only 150 kg/ha
over 1995.
In Uruguay the drought affected only a few producers in Artigas who had low
initial water levels in their dams. The January rains saved most producers with initial
low water levels. Generally, it was an excellent crop year in Uruguay with lots of
sunlight and few low-temperature days. Average yields were close to 6.0 MT, a 500-
kg/ha increase over 1994/95.
Higher-than-normal precipitation levels have been forecast for October to De-
cember 1996 in Rio Grande do Sul. While this will aid in filling reservoirs, it will also
delay and possibly prevent planting in some areas (MERCOARROZ, October 17,
1996). In Argentina, normal precipitation and above-normal temperatures have been
forecast during planting. In October needed rain fell in Corrientes, but another 100
mm are needed in Entre Rios. Due to lack of rain and high temperatures in Entre
Rios, many producers began irrigating early. On October 25, 53% of Argentinean
area was planted, with 34% in Corrientes and 68% in Entre Rios. As of early
November 1996, reservoir levels in Uruguay were adequate to irrigate the 155,000
ha that are expected to be planted.
Fig. 3. MERCOSUR rough rice yields (kg/ha), 1960/61 - 1996/97.
(Source: Comision Sectorial del Arroz, Bolsa de Cereales, SAPyA, IBGE, 1995)
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Production Trends
Irrigated and upland rice production trends are derived from the joint area and
yield trends (see Fig. 4). Since 1960/61 irrigated rice production has increased by a
factor of about four, currently being around 4 million MT in Brazil, 900,000 MT in
Uruguay and over 1 million MT in Argentina (assuming normal yields). This growth
has been relatively smooth. However, due to a decline in area, Brazilian irrigated
production has fallen in each of the past two crop years (94/95 and 95/96) and is
expected to fall again in 1996/97. Upland production levels have fallen sharply in the
1990s to less than 6 million MT. Upland production peaked in the late 1970s at
about 7.8 million MT. The rate of growth in upland production is expected to
continue to be negative due to declining area.
In 1995/96 both Argentina and Uruguay planted record high areas, expecting
record production levels. Due to almost ideal growing conditions, Uruguay achieved
this goal with an increase of about 158,000 MT over the 1994/95 production record
of 808,000 MT. With a planted area of 208,000 ha, Argentina was expected to
break the 1 million MT barrier. Lack of rainfall, particularly in Corrientes, reduced
yields and caused some fields to be abandoned altogether. In spite of average yields of
4.6 MT/ha, Argentinean production exceeded the 1994/95 record by 99,000 MT.
Due to a combination of both lower planted area and inadequate rainfall, Rio Grande
do Sul irrigated production fell over 900 thousand MT to about 4.1 million MT in
1995/96.
Fig. 4. MERCOSUR rough rice production
(000’s MT, 1960/61 - 1996/97). Source: See Fig. 3
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Sparks America Del Sur expects Argentina to produce another record rice crop
in 1997, which they estimate at 1.08 million MT (MERCOARROZ, November 4,
1996). This is based on an additional 11,000 ha planted and more normal precipita-
tion. Although planted area in Uruguay will hold steady or slightly increase, it is
unlikely that the almost ideal growing conditions in 1995/96 will be repeated in
1996/97. Thus production is expected to fall from 966,000 MT to 891,000 MT.
Production in Brazil is expected to fall 8% over 1995/96 to 9.3 million MT due to a
similar decline in area.
Producer Prices and Costs
Over the past 35 years, MERCOSUR nominal rough rice prices have had four
phases:
• From 1960/61 to 1971/72 when prices varied between $5 and $10 (100
kg),
• From 1972/73 to 1982/83 when prices were over $15 and frequently
exceeded $20,
• Mid-1980’s when prices fell to between $10 and $15 and
• After 1987, a rebound to around $20 (see Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. MERCOSUR irrigated rough rice prices (current annual average),
1960/61 - 1994/95. (Source: Comision Sectorial de Arroz,
Bolsa de Cereales, Sparks America del Sur, 1995; IRGA, 1995)
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As of November 1996, prices for rough rice (10% or less brokens) was in the
$21 to $23 range. In Argentina, Double Carolina rice commands a 20-30% premium,
while in Brazil, upland rice receives a 30% discount. These premiums/discounts are
largely due to perceived quality differences among consumers. When rough rice prices
are converted into constant 1995 U.S. dollars, the scenario given by that of Fig. 5
changes substantially. Real rice prices were the highest in the 1970s ($30 to $45/
100 kg). Prices since 1981/82 have been their lowest in real terms since the late
1960s, around $15 to $25.
The law of one price (LOP) was tested for MERCOSUR irrigated rough rice
markets (Argentina and Rio Grande do Sul) and between the MERCOSUR and the
United States using monthly 1981 to 1995 price data (Bierlen et al., 1996a). The
LOP is the notion that efficient trade and arbitrage activities will ensure that prices in
spatially separated markets, adjusted for exchange rates and transportation costs, will
be equalized. In its extreme form, the LOP implies that there is a single representative
price that is common to all markets. Using Johansen’s multivariate cointegration
method, weak support was found for the LOP for MERCOSUR rice markets for the
full sample 1981 to 1995 period, no support for the LOP for the 1981 to 1990 pre-
MERCOSUR period and strong support in the 1991 to 1995 MERCOSUR period
both within the MERCOSUR and between the MERCOSUR and the United States.
Support for the LOP during the MERCOSUR trade regime is expected because of the
flow of rough rice from Argentina and Uruguay to Rio Grande do Sul and the close
proximity of the three production areas, insuring that arbitrage can readily be per-
formed. The results support the notion that lower trade barriers, greater reliance on
market forces and a greater volume of trade led to the existence of a single reference
price.
While irrigated production technology is similar, costs vary among the three
nations. Recently, production costs have decreased in Argentina and increased in
Brazil due to economic liberalization, currency revaluations that have accompanied
economic stabilization programs, tax reforms, privatization and regional integration.
Costs in Uruguay have remained stable, however. Assuming 5-MT yields, current
estimated costs are lowest in Corrientes at $716.13/ha ($6.51/50 kg), followed by
Entre Rios at $918.26/ha ($8.35/50 kg), Uruguay at $1042.22/ha ($9.47/50 kg)
and Rio Grande do Sul at $1208.79/ha ($11.35/50 kg) (Table 4). Although varying
by region, per-kilogram MERCOSUR costs are competitive with production costs in
the United States (Bierlen et al., 1996b). Cost differences are primarily due to differ-
ences in taxation levels, the price of land and soil fertility. Soil quality is generally
considered to be better in Uruguay and Argentina (where land prices are lower) than
in Rio Grande do Sul. As a result, Rio Grande do Sul tends to need higher input levels
in order to produce yields comparable to the other two nations. Soil quality is highest
in Corrientes (where prices are lowest) where expansion potential is also the highest.
Recent increases in fertilizer costs have hit producers with low-fertility land the hard-
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est. Average upland costs are estimated at $237.87/ha (Table 5). With an assumed
yield of 1.5 MT/ha, per-bag costs are $8.30.
MARKETING
The marketing system moves rice from the farm gate to the consumer. Typical
rice marketing functions include drying, storage, milling, byproduct disposal, packag-
ing, transportation and retailing. Major problems are the high costs of milling, trans-
portation and financing storage. A problem unique to Brazil is the loss of large
quantities of rice (primarily upland) due to high humidity and temperatures, insects
and substandard storage units.
Drying and Storage
Rough rice is dried following harvest. Humidity must be reduced to 14% before
rice can be properly stored and milled. Because undried rice is highly perishable in the
Amazon basin (humid tropics), timely drying is especially critical in this region. It has
been estimated that 20% of the Brazilian rice harvest (predominantly upland) is lost
each year (IRGA, 1993). Drying and storage technologies are generally more ad-
vanced in the irrigated than in the upland regions. Upland rice is typically field-dried
and stored in small, rudimentary facilities while irrigated producers use driers and
large, modern storage facilities. Large upland producers, however, tend to use driers
and store in more modern storage facilities. Large producers and mills are responsible
for the bulk of drying and storage.
Table 4. MERCOSUR irrigated rough rice production costs in US$/ha, 1994/95.
Brazil Argentina
Item Rio G do Sul Uruguay Entre Rios Corrientes
Land rent 173.19 157.84 105.00 83.33
Pre-planting prep. 210.37 97.69 97.20 -
Irrigation 219.88 107.06 238.19 -
Labor -b 138.42 - 113.97
Machinery repair - 75.68 - 45.70
Fuel - - - 109.30
Seed, fert & pest 223.56 178.44 169.57 140.01
Harvest 74.42 66.27 87.50 -
Transportation 76.35 71.48 22.50 25.25
Drying 77.06 54.83 54.83 66.66
Management 39.39 42.04 32.00 32.43
Finance charge 49.96 13.23 53.33 -
Other 104.84 39.24 58.14 99.48
Total Costa 1248.99 1042.22 918.26 716.13
Cost per 50 kg 12.49 10.42 9.18 7.16
aAssumes yields of 5,000 kg of rough rice/ha.
b - Subsumed under other costs.
Source: Sparks America del Sur, 1995.
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In Rio Grande do Sul there are about 1600 driers with a daily drying capacity of
132,000 MT, and 2.1 million MT of conventional and 3.7 million MT of modern silo
storage capacity (see Table 6). The bulk of storage is located on the western border
(with Argentina) with 1.2 million MT of capacity and the north Atlantic coast with 2.3
million MT of capacity. Storage is adequate to handle state production as well as
Argentinean and Uruguayan imports. Large farms tend to perform their own drying
and storage while small farms hire the services of co-operatives.
There is excess storage capacity in Argentina due to the presence of numerous
mills that operate at suboptimal levels. Total storage capacity consists of 750,000 MT
of farm-level storage, 1.3 million MT of mill-level storage and 38,000 MT of port-level
storage. Large producers are more likely to own storage and drying facilities than
small producers. Most producers, however, are unable to store more than 100 MT.
There is a higher percentage of on-farm drying and storage in Corrientes, where large
producers dominate, than in Entre Rios. In Uruguay, mills dry and store 80 to 85% of
rough rice. The remainder of drying and storage is performed by large producers.
Table 5. Brazilian upland rough rice production costs in U.S.$/ha, 1994/95.
Item Unit Quantity Price/Unit % of Cost Total Cost
Inputs 54.69 149.77
Seed kg 55.0 0.97 53.23
Furadan lt 0.8 17.76 14.22
Fertilizer(04-30-10) kg 200.0 0.23 45.16
Zinc Sulfate kg 20.0 0.71 14.19
Mirex kg 0.2 4.82 0.97
Casumin lt 1.0 12.33 12.23
50 kilo bags bag 30.0 0.32 9.67
Machinery 38.28 104.84
Pre-incorporation(18 discs) machinery hr 1.2 16.13 19.35
Plowing (3 bottoms) machinery hr 2.7 16.13 43.55
Leveling(36 discs) machinery hr 0.5 16.13 8.07
Planting/Fertilizing(10 row) machinery hr 0.6 16.13 9.68
Pulverizing machinery hr 0.5 16.13 8.07
Harvester machinery hr 1.0 16.13 16.13
Services 4.12 11.29
Seed treatment dh 0.1 7.53 0.75
Planting dh 0.3 7.53 2.26
Formicide application dh 0.1 7.53 1.53
Harvest dh 1.0 7.53 7.73
Administrative Charge(3%) 2.91 7.97
Total Cost 273.87
Cost per 50 kga 9.13
aAssumes a yield per hectare of 1,500 kg.
Source: Central Nacional de Pesquisa de Arroz e Feijao, 1995.
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 In Argentina and Uruguay, on-farm drying and storage facilities give producers
greater marketing flexibility, in particular, the ability to sell rough rice directly to Rio
Grande do Sul mills. This practice is most common in the northern production areas
of Uruguay and in Corrientes. This is facilitated by the high concentration of Brazilian
producers (who have operations in Argentina and Uruguay) in these areas and weaker
ties between mills and producers in northern Uruguay than in eastern Uruguay.
Milling and Byproducts
 Milling firms range from small, single-mill, family-run firms to large, multi-mill
corporations. Private mills dominate, but co-operatives are important in Argentina
and Rio Grande do Sul. Large mills typically operate at full capacity, have high
technical levels and hire specialized labor. Small- and medium-sized mills operate
about 8 and 16 hours a day (often on a seasonal basis), respectively. Compared to the
larger mills, small- and medium-sized mills have less modern milling equipment and
hire non-specialized labor. Equipment (including parboiling equipment) is predomi-
nantly Brazilian, but some mills are outfitted with Japanese, German and U.S. equip-
ment.
The Brazilian milling sector is characterized by excess capacity, a profusion of
retail labels, a disregard for economies of scale and, with the liberalization of the
Brazilian rice market, declining profit margins. Idle capacity is worse in the upland
zones due to a significant contraction in production. Declining profit margins have
placed pressure on mills to increase volume or capacity utilization, which has resulted
in significant downsizing, a trend that began in the 1980’s and has accelerated in the
1990’s.
 There are approximately 745 mills operating in Rio Grande do Sul, the bulk of
which are located in the five principal production areas (Table 6). Currently, about
180 mills process at least 250 MT/month (commercial size). Commercial mills oper-
ate closer to full capacity, while non-commercial mills are closing or have no growth.
Many non-commercial mills continue to operate by performing contract milling. About
50% of Rio Grande do Sul rice is milled by private firms, 35% is milled by co-ops, and
15% is used for seed or milled in other states. The three largest firms account for 30%
Table 6. Number, milling and storage capacity of rice mills in Rio Grande do Sul.
Number of Milling Non-Modern Silo Storage
Region Mills Capacity Storage Capacity Capacity
MT/hour MT MT
Campanha (Plains) 103 178 303,225 352,830
Western border 153 426 463,870 772,384
South coast 106 354 590,301 352,781
North coast 194 275 345,216 1,911,137
Central Depression 169 223 407,578 313,443
Total 725 1456 2,110,190 3,702,575
Source: IRGA, 1993.
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of total milling, the 11 largest 47%, the 50 largest 71%, and commercial mills 95%
(see Table 7 for the 25 largest mills and Table 8 for percentage of total milling
capacity by municipio [county]). The five largest mills are vertically integrated in
production, milling and marketing. Several large mills are located close to production
areas in Argentina and Uruguay, which gives them greater flexibility in rough rice
procurement. There is no reliable information on the number, size, technology, etc.,
of Brazilian mills outside of Rio Grande do Sul. However, mills in upland regions tend
to be smaller, less technically advanced and more numerous than in irrigated areas.
There are 41 rice co-ops in Rio Grande do Sul with 58 active mills, 30 of which
operate on a commercial level. About 10,000 of the state’s 12,000 producers are co-
operative members. Co-ops include four of the five and seven of the 25 largest milling
firms (see Table 7). The four largest co-ops each mill more than 5000 MT/month.
The three largest co-ops mill 21% of the rice in the state, the five largest 24%, and the
16 largest 30%. Shares of total co-op rice milled in the state for these co-ops are
61%, 70% and 87%, respectively. Recent co-op growth has been slow or negative
among large and small co-ops, while medium-sized co-ops have grown significantly.
Most Argentinean mills are small, family-owned, vertically integrated, into produc-
tion and have relatively low technical levels. The largest technical problem is a lack of
physical integration from storage to the loading dock, resulting in the excess use of
unskilled labor. Like drying and storage facilities, mills are often purchased by produc-
ers during highly profitable years with the idea that “procesando duplicamos la
cosecha” (by milling we double the harvest) but frequently without regard to cost and
marketing considerations. Brazilian-made mills can be purchased for as little as $80,000.
Small mills operate only three or four months out of the year, milling as little as 1500
MT annually. They pay higher prices for their rough rice and are unable to secure
rough rice by guaranteeing production loans. Few mills are well situated with respect
to ports on the Paraná and Uruguay rivers and railheads. With continued downsizing
this is likely to change because more mills will have the necessary volume to utilize rail
and water transport.
The Argentinean milling industry is also downsizing with the exit of primarily
smaller mills. In 1995, 104 mills were operating, down from 150 in 1990. Factors
that indicate that small mills will continue to exit the industry are 1) the demise of
small Brazilian mills that are the principal buyers of their milled rice, 2) the inability to
produce large minimum quantities needed to receive transportation discounts and to
enter export markets and 3) the increasing need to be cost competitive. Only 12 mills
have a milling capacity in excess of 4 MT/hour. About 16 firms do 70% of the
milling. On the national level, 51% of milling capacity is located in Entre Rios, 33% in
Corrientes and 16% in other provinces.
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Table 7. Location and production of 25 largest rice mills in Rio Grande do Sul, 1994.
Company Name Location Monthly Prod Annual Prod
------000's MT-------
1 SUPRARROZ Pelotas 40.9 490.8
2 Co-op. AGRICOLA ITAQUIENSE Itaqui 35.9 431.7
3 Co-op. ARROZEIRA EXTREMO SUL Pelotas 25.0 300.0
4 Co-op. AGROINDUSTRIAL ALEGRETE Alegrete 9.2 98.8
5 Co-op. TRITICOLA SEPEENSE Sao Sepe 8.0 95.7
6 IND. E COM. SANTA LUCIA Camaqua 6.5 78.0
7 URBANO AGROINDUSTRIAL Sao Gabriel 5.9 70.4
8 HELMUTH TESSMANN & CIA Camaqua 5.8 69.8
9 Co-op. AGRICOLA IMEMBUY Sao Borja 5.4 65.0
10 CEREALISTA PIRAHY Sao Borja 5.3 63.0
11 ENG. DE ARROZ CORADINI Dom Pedrito 5.0 60.2
13 NELSON WENDT Pelotas 4.5 54.3
14 PILLECO Alegrete 4.2 50.5
15 ICR CEREAIS Sao Borja 3.6 43.6
16 Co-op. REG. TRIT. SERRANA Dom Pedrito 3.5 42.2
17 KARROZ-COM. E EEPRES. Osorio 3.2 38.4
18 DOMINGOS CASARIN & CIA. Pelotas 2.8 34.0
19 ARROZEIRA ZACHER Camaqua 2.8 33.3
20 CEREALISTA ALBARUSKA Sao Borja 2.8 33.3
21 Co-op. AGRICOLA URUGUAINA Uruguaina 2.7 32.2
22 PROD. ALIM. ORLANDIA Pelotas 2.6 30.7
23 ENGENHO A.M. LTDA. Eldorado D 2.5 30.1
24 CEREALISTA TOMAZONI Uruguaina 2.5 29.9
25 ARROZ AGROIND. DO SUL Itaqui 2.5 29.5
Source: FEDARROZ.
Table 8. Location of Rio Grande do Sul milling capacity by municipio.
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Argentinean mills compete for rough rice deliveries based on price, location and
producer services such as the financing of production inputs. Mills forward contract
with producers to purchase rough rice. Payment is in the form of production inputs or
cash (usually paid in installments). One mill found bartering rough rice for diesel fuel
(sold 9 million liters in a recent year) to be an important and profitable component of
its operations. In order to ease producer harvest costs, mills purchase rough rice in
the fields and transport it to their mills at their own expense. About one-half of the
Argentinean rice crop is sold during the harvest season (Personal communication -
Eric Ingouville).
While Argentinean private mills dominate the industry, co-ops continue to be
important. There are nine rice co-ops in Entre Rios and two in Corrientes. Although
many producers are members, co-ops typically purchase the bulk of their rough rice
from a small number of members. Profits are distributed to members based on shares
and rough rice deliveries. Co-ops also sell production inputs to members, often
bartering them for rough rice.
Argentinean mills tend to specialize in either domestic or export markets. Small
mills tend to export to Brazil exclusively and/or participate in regional domestic
markets. Rio de la Plata, Sagemüller, Molinos ALA, Suca S.A., Mocovi and La
Arrocera Argentina, S.A. (Gallo) have national consumer brands. Glencore Cereales
S.A. and Molinos ALA dominate the export side. Few mills can handle large export
orders due to lack of quality uniformity.
Glencore, which exports about two-thirds of Argentinean rice, has a unique
operation. Glencore procures rough rice through forward contracts with producers
and then contracts with other firms to mill the rice. Because of the large quantities it
exports, Glencore is able to utilize low-cost rail and barge transportation. Like smaller
mills, however, Glencore is still unable to ship large quantities of uniform quality rice.
Marc Rich, the founder of Glencore, has recently sold his interests in Glencore and is
starting a new firm based on the Glencore model. This should increase the competi-
tive conditions among Argentinean export mills, now dominated by Glencore. In-
creased growth in the Argentinean rice sector could see the entry of other Buenos
Aires grain trading houses (Glencore is currently the only one) into the rice export
business.
In contrast to Brazil and Argentina, there are relatively few milling firms in
Uruguay, 20 firms with 29 mills (see Table 9 for names, locations and capacity).
Firms with multiple mills are SAMAN with seven, Casarone with three and COOPAR
with two. Ten mills are located in the northern production zone: six in Artigas, two in
Tacuarembo and one in Rivera. Eighteen mills are located in the eastern production
zone: six in Cerro Largo, six in Treinta y Tres, four in Rocha and one in Lavalleja.
One mill is located in the port of Montevideo. All mills are privately owned and have
relatively good technical levels. The most important mills are equipped with Japanese
and U.S. technology (Satake and Carter). Industry milling capacity is 167 MT/hour,
or more than 1 million MT annually. The five largest firms, which account for 68.6%
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Table 9. Location and capacity of Uruguayan rice mills, 1996.
Name Capacity  Location
 MT/hour
ACAMAY S.A. 3.0 Montevideo
ARROZAL 33 S.A. 10.0 Montevideo
ARROZUR S.A. 12.0 Treinta y Tres
CARLIN 3.0 Chuy
CASARONE AGROINDUSTRIAL S.A. 17.3 Montevideo
COLIS S.A. 2.0 Bella Union
COOPAR S.A. 14.0 Montevideo
COPAINOR R.S. 7.0 Montevideo
DAMBORIARENA ESCOSTEGUY SRL 3.7 Rivera
DEMELFOR S.A. 3.8 Artigas
KHI ARROZ LTDA. 2.6 Chuy
MOLINO ARROCERO BELLA UNION 1.4 Montevideo
MOL. ARROC. CERRO LARGO SRL 5.0 Melo
MOLINO ARROZ BENKE SRL 2.0 ——a
OLINA S.A. 5.2 Montevideo
OVER Y CIA. SRL 4.0 ——a
PIVETTA HERMANOS SRL 1.2 Artigas
PROCIPA S.A. 5.5 Montevideo
S.A. MOLINOS ARROCEROS NACIONAL (SAMAN) 61.0 Montevideo
TOPSIL S.A. 3.0 Montevideo
Total 166.7
a --- Unknown location.
Source: Comision Sectorial del Arroz.
of installed capacity, are SAMAN, Casarone, COOPAR, Arrozal 33 and Arrozur.
SAMAN alone accounts for nearly 37% of installed capacity but is thought to mill a
higher percentage of the total because it runs closer to capacity than other firms.
Arrozal 33 is owned and operated by the largest Rio Grande do Sul producer, who
operates 43,000 ha in Rio Grande do Sul and 6500 ha in Uruguay.
 Uruguayan mills compete for rough rice deliveries based on location, the terms
of production loans and the rental price of land and water. Because 90 to 95% of
Uruguayan rough rice is sold under an average marketing year pricing scheme (see
page 51), price is typically not a point of competition. Producers may be limited to
marketing their rough rice to a single mill when that mill is their landlord or is the only
supplier of water to their land.
There are about 53 plants with parboiling facilities in the region. The bulk of
these—38—are in Rio Grande Do Sul (see Table 10). There are two parboiling
facilities in Argentina, one operated by Molinos Rio de la Plata (Bunge and Borge) and
the other by La Arrocera Argentina (Gallo). Molinos ALA swaps white milled rice
(which carries a premium in Brazil) for parboiled rice (which carries a premium in
Argentina) with Suprarroz, a large Rio Grande do Sul mill. In Uruguay, the nation’s
only parboiling facility, Arrozur, is jointly operated by the five largest mills. SAMAN
retains a 46% interest in Arrozur, COOPAR 27%, Casarone 12.5% and Procipa and
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Arrozal 33 the remaining 14.5%. The annual 70,000-MT capacity of the U.S. tech-
nology plant is divided among the partners according to their number of shares. The
parboiling service is performed at cost to each partner. The parboiled rice is marketed
under each partner’s individual brand name. Although there was a substantial pre-
mium for parboiled rice at the time of construction (early 1980’s), the facility currently
has a low profitability level due to weakened demand for parboiled rice. Like Argen-
tina, however, the plant gives the Uruguayan rice industry the ability to enter par-
boiled export markets. Tropical varieties, not Blue Belle or similar varieties, are
typically used for parboiling.
Brazilian and Argentinean milling costs are presented in Table 11. Uruguayan
milling costs are thought to be similar to those in Argentina. Estimated FOB costs for
milled rice are $454/MT in Brazil and $301 in Argentina. Milling costs account for
$203 and $119 of total costs, respectively. These estimates indicate that FOB mill
prices in Brazil are about 50% higher than in Argentina. About half of the cost
difference is accounted for by higher Brazilian tax levels.8 The other half of the price
difference is due to higher Brazilian production and milling costs.
Weekly MERCOSUR FOB mill prices per MT of milled Tipo 1 rice (10% or less
brokens) are graphed in Fig. 6 from October 1993 to January 1996 for the cities of
Uruguayana, Chui and Saõ Paulo. Uruguayana is a crossing point on the Brazilian
border in Argentina, and Chui is a crossing point in Uruguay. The three prices move
together closely. This is not surprising since the bulk of Brazilian imports of Argentinean
Table 11. 1995 milling costs.
Item Rio Grande do Sul Argentina
 -----------$/MT of Milled Rice----------
1.62 MT of Rough Rice 283.19 227.27
Taxes 10.26
Transportation Field/Mill 1.33 (7.07)a
Total Cost of Rough Rice 294.78 220.20
Milling and Packaging 97.78 59.13
Milling Margin 23.58 23.58
Taxes 66.45
Selling, Grading, and Others 15.47 36.09
Total Milling Costs 203.28 118.80
Byproducts (44.44)a (38.36)a
FOB Mill Cost 453.62 300.64
aIncome
Source: Sparks America del Sur, 1995.
8See page 49 for further discussion on Brazilian taxes.
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and Uruguayan rice crosses the border at Uruguayana and Chui, respectively, and
Saõ Paulo is the largest deficit market in Brazil, located less than 1000 miles away.
As expected, Saõ Paulo carries a constant premium over the price of its exporting
neighbors, and Uruguayan rice carries a slight premium over Argentinean rice, which
is consistent with quality perceptions.
The milling process typically produces 65 to 75% polished rice (head rice and
brokens), 19 to 23% husks, 8 to 12% bran and 3 to 5% impurities. Income from
byproducts (broken rice, husks and bran) has a major impact on a mill’s profitability.
Large mills are generally able to dispose of byproducts in a more profitable manner
than small mills. Byproducts have diverse uses. In Rio Grande do Sul, the husks are
used as fuel for drying and parboiling and as litter in the large domestic poultry
industry. Bran is used as an animal feed and further processed into edible rice oil
using domestic technology. Two Rio Grande do Sul firms produce rice oil. Suprarroz,
the largest milling firm, markets a rice oil under its brand name, Tio João. The beer
and animal feed industries purchase most of the broken rice.
The recent upswing in production has created a byproduct disposal problem in
Argentina and Uruguay, which may intensify with time unless new uses are found. In
Argentina, husks are utilized as livestock feed, fuel for drying rough rice and litter for
the southern Entre Rios poultry industry. The use of husks for electrical generation
has been discussed among San Salvador (Entre Rios) millers. Bran is sold as a
livestock feed, but currently no bran oil extraction or refining is performed in the
country.
Fig. 6. MERCOSUR Tippo 1 prices. Source: MERCOARROZ, various issues.
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Major byproduct uses in Uruguay are husks and bran for animal feed, husks for
litter and fuel to parboil and dry rough rice. In addition to parboiling, Arrozur also
extracts and refines bran oil. The five mills who own Arrozur sell stabilized bran to the
firm. The spent bran is returned to the five mills where it is sold as animal feed. The
refined oil is sold under the Arrozur name in Brazil. Arrozur also exports crude oil and
bran to Brazil.
Grading
There are currently no uniform MERCOSUR quality and inspection standards.
There is, however, a desire by the industry to have uniform milled rice grading
standards, and the five countries are currently working together toward that end. It is
thought that uniform MERCOSUR milled rice grades will closely follow the current
Brazilian grading system as it is the dominant consumer. The percentage of brokens
appears to be the most important milled rice grading characteristic in the region.
Brazilian mills tend to set their own internal rough rice grades, but there are
industry-wide milled rice grades known as Tipo 1, Tipo 2 ..... and Tipo 5. Tipo 1 rice
has 10% or less brokens and Tipo 2 has 20% or less brokens. Irrigated rice falls into
grades Tipo 1 and Tipo 2, with the bulk in the Tipo 2 classification. Upland rice falls
into Tipo 2 and lower quality grades. Brazilian imports from Argentina and Uruguay
are 25% or less brokens; most would be classified as Tipo 2.
Argentina has three domestic milled rice grades, which are also used at the retail
level: quintuple zero (00000) with 15% or less brokens, quadruple zero (0000) with
25% or less brokens and second grades with 38% or less brokens. Second grade is
sold to low-income households or as pet food. Argentinean and Uruguayan exports to
Brazil are classified under the Brazilian grading system. Rough rice grades are set at
the state level in Argentina. Discounts and premiums on rough rice are a percentage
of the market price (see Table 12 for an example). In accordance with Argentinean
law, sample testing by mills is carefully performed in order to readily resolve producer-
miller quality disputes. Uruguay does not have official grades for either rough or
milled rice. However, discounts and premiums are given for deviations from industry
norms for rough rice. In Uruguay, both mills and the Asociacion de Cultivadores de
Arroz (Rice Producers Association) take test samples. The two groups work together
to resolve quality disputes.
Transportation
MERCOSUR transportation is inadequate and costly by world standards. This
has been exacerbated by the recent increase in economic activity due to domestic
reforms and regional integration. Due to security reasons and government policies,
which promoted self-sufficiency, transportation links among the five nations have
traditionally been poor. Even though expensive and insufficient in number, the bulk of
MERCOSUR rice is transported by truck. The region’s rail system is inadequate and
lacks integration and gauge uniformity.
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Although currently underutilized, the Paraná-Uruguay river transportation system
holds the most promise for reducing transportation costs for bulk commodities such
as rice. Currently, however, most mills lack the volume to use this transportation
mode. Because the two rivers straddle the Argentinean production area (Corrientes
and Entre Rios), Argentina should be in the best position to take advantage of an
improved river system in shipping to Brazil. The Uruguay river, however, has a dam
without a lock; the river, in effect, is navigable only from just north of Condordia
(northern Entre Rios) to Buenos Aires, and shipping is limited to 5000 MT. Any
serious improvement of the system will have to rectify this. Currently the river system,
known as the hidrovia in Brazil, is being expanded and improved. The hidrovia will
harness the Paraná and the Paraguay rivers, which drain the continent’s largest river
basin (after the Amazon) to the needs of modern trade. From Caceres in Brazil, it will
stretch 3,450 km to Buenos Aires. Developers see this as the Mississippi River of
South America, carrying goods on barges up and down the river. Some have pro-
claimed it the backbone of the MERCOSUR. Increased use of the hidrovia should
reduce rice transportation costs dramatically. Minor improvements estimated at $100
million should cut the time it takes to travel from Caceres to Buenos Aires in half and
increase barge sizes to 2000 MT on the lower river and to 500 MT on the upper
reaches. There is currently a rail link from the Paraná to the city of Saõ Paulo. This
will be supplemented with a barge canal, which is being financed by the state of Saõ
Paulo.
The Brazilian road system, the backbone of the nation’s transportation system
and by which the bulk of rice is transported, is in a general state of disrepair due to a
lack of maintenance and damage from overloaded trucks. Historically, little impor-
tance has been placed on rail and river transportation networks. Railroads are unreli-
able and frequently delayed. Only 8% of Rio Grande do Sul’s rough rice and 0.5% of
milled rice are shipped by rail. South to north shipments frequently use intracoastal
shipping. Traditionally, intra-coastal shipping has been closed to non-Brazilian ship-
ping. Recently, however, the Brazilian government has allowed non-Brazilian ships to
compete in that trade. One of the biggest problems in importing rice into Brazil by
ocean transport, and actually considered by many to be a significant non-tariff barrier,
is ocean port costs. Due to a strong longshoreman’s union, which uses 50-year-old
labor efficiency standards to determine wage rates, unloading costs run $17 to $18/
MT. Due to this, the government has allowed three or four private firms to develop
port facilities with non-union longshoremen. High port costs are an advantage to
Argentina and Uruguay, who ship the bulk of their rice into Brazil by truck and rail.
The Rio Grande do Sul government has made recent efforts to improve the
state’s transportation infrastructure. This has included rebuilding and improved main-
tenance of the current road system, adding more paved roads and improving connec-
tions with the highway systems of Argentina and Uruguay. There is also an interest in
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extending the current rail and river transportation systems and better integrating them
with other modes of transportation.
The predominant transportation problem in Argentina for the rice industry is the
logistics of shipping rice to Brazil. Most rice moves into Brazil at a single crossing
point at Uruguayana by truck and, to a lesser degree, by rail. Due to inadequate
infrastructure, three-week delays are not unknown. Argentina’s fleet of trucks is old
and inadequate. There is a large back order for new trucks. Although less costly, the
rail system has limited capacity, and small mills lack the volume to utilize it. Rice must
compete with wheat, corn and soybeans, which have much larger volumes, for limited
rail capacity. Railroad rates in Argentina are about 12% higher than those in the
United States and 11% higher than in Europe.
 Due to the large volumes it markets, Glencore has been the most innovative rice
exporter in utilizing available transportation. It has shipped rice across Uruguay to
Brazil using Uruguayan rail. Second, it has shipped rice up the Paraná river from
Corrientes to Corumba, Mato Grosso do Sul, where it is shipped by train to Saõ
Paulo. Finally, Glencore has contracted with the Ferrocarril de Mesopotamia (the local
railroad) to ship 150,000 MT of rice to Brazil via Uruguayana. This has been possible
due to the large volumes that Glencore ships.
Uruguay is considered to have the best surface transportation system in the
region because of substantial investment (responsible for much of its external debt) by
the former military government. Transportation costs, however, are high, because fuel
taxes are among the highest in Latin America. To its advantage, production zones are
located within a short drive to one of six border crossing points with Rio Grande do
Sul (four have rail connections) and to Montevideo, the nation’s major port.
Retailing and Retail Prices
The structure of the MERCOSUR retail food sector is mixed. Large supermarkets
and hypermarts predominate in large urban centers such as Sao Paulõ, Rio de
Janeiro and Belo Horizonte in Brazil; Buenos Aires in Argentina; and Montevideo and
Punta del Este in Uruguay. Small supermarkets and mom-and-pop stores dominate in
small cities and rural areas. In large urban centers, food selection is good and
international in scope, and speciality departments such as delis, prepared food and
bakeries are present in supermarkets. However, MERCOSUR supermarkets generally
lack the variety of selection within each food group, including rice, that would be
present in U.S. supermarkets.
Millers’ brand name white and parboiled rice are the most important rice prod-
ucts. Processed, brown and mixes are present but are less important. In urban areas
of Brazil, private label rice has an important presence. Private label rice is unimpor-
tant in Argentina, and Uruguay and is not a widely used marketing concept.
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In May and June of 1995 the authors collected prices for 1-kg bags of rice in
Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Porto Alegre (Rio Grande do Sul) and Saõ Paulo super-
markets. The prices, in U.S. dollars, are in Tables 13 to 15. Prices tended to be
highest in Argentina, followed by Uruguay and Brazil. This is consistent with the
perceptions of Buenos Aires as a high-quality market and Brazil as a low-quality
market. El Dorado and Carrefour are hypermarts in Saõ Paulo, and S.M. is a small
neighborhood grocery store in central Porto Alegre. The highest Brazilian prices are
for Uncle Ben’s precooked rice and a specialized brown rice product found in El
Dorado. Tipo 1 white milled prices ranged from $0.48 to $0.75. Tipo 2 white milled
prices ranged from $0.51 to $0.56. The only Tipo 3 rice encountered was priced at
$0.42 in Porto Alegre. Parboiled rice did appear to carry a slight premium over white
milled rice. The price of Tipo 1 parboiled rice ranged from $0.55 to $0.96 and Tipo
2 from $0.63 to $0.69.
Table 13. Brazilian retail rice prices ($/kg), June 1995.a
El Dorado Carrefour S.M.
Descriptionb Saõ Paulo Saõ Paulo Porto Alegre
Tipo 1
Uncle Ben’s Roris Brown Rice - Precooked 2.52
Uncle Ben’s Regular Brown Rice - Precooked 1.40
Uncle Ben’s Converted - Parboiled 0.96 0.80
Provita Arrocita - Polished 0.57
Tio João - Polished 0.69 0.74 0.75
Camil - Polished 0.59
Dorado (private label) 0.64
Tio Belo - Polished 0.63
Tio Patinho - Polished 0.56
Brejeiro - Polished “Irrigated Rice” 0.70
Novo Rozcato - Parboiled 0.55
Arroz Nacional 0.58
Tres Patinhas 0.51
Arroz Compe Bem 0.48
Rissul 0.58
Blue Ville - Parboiled 0.55
Requinte - Polished 0.65
Tipo 2
Natu’s - Brown Rice “Natural Product” 2.99
Camil 0.56
Tio Mingote - Parboiled 0.69 0.65 0.63
Arroz Patinho 0.52
Rei do Sul - Polished 0.51
Arroz Canoas 0.45
Arroz Butui - Polished 0.50
Tipo 3
Arroz Falador 0.42
aPrice at time price was collected
bLong grain white milled except where noted
Source: the authors.
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Table 14. Argentinean retail rice prices ($/kg), June 1995.a
Carrefour Tia Express
Descriptionb Buenos Aires  Buenos Aires
00000
Arroz Barbara - Parboiled (Sagemuller) 1.39 1.65
Arroz Barbara (Sagemuller) 1.17 1.05
Arroz Barbara - Double Carolina (Sagemuller) 1.15 1.59
Arroz Barbara - Brown Rice (Sagemuller) 1.37
ALA Dorado - Parboiled 1.39
Blue Bell (ALA) 1.18
ALA Doble - Double Carolina 1.57
Arroz Maxima - Parboiled (Molinos Rio de la Plata) 1.55 1.85
Arroz Maxima - Brown Parboiled (Molinos Rio de la Plata) 2.77
Arroz Maxima Doble Blanco - Double Carolina (Molinos
Rio de la Plata) 1.99 2.25
Condor Double - Double Carolina (Molinos Rio de la Plata 1.62
Arroz Condor (Molinos Rio de la Plata) 1.25
Arroz Gallo Oro - Parboiled (La Arrocera Argentina) 1.82 1.95
Gallo - Brown Rice (La Arrocera Argentina) 2.69 2.88
Arroz Doble Gallo - Double Carolina (La Arrocera Argentina) 2.49 2.10
Arroz Gallo (LaArrocera Argentina) 1.99 1.39
Gallo - Boiling-Bags 2.49
Dos Hermanos “Blue Bonnet” 1.69
0000
Arroz 53 ‘Blue Bonnet’ 0.81
Nutri Max 0.72
aPrice at time price was collected
bLong grain white milled except where noted
Source: the authors.
In Buenos Aires, prices were collected in Carrefour, a hypermart like its sister
store in Sao Paulõ, and Tia Express, a small center-city supermarket. Not surprisingly,
prices in Tia Express were generally found to be higher than those in Carrefour. Most
prices were over $1 and ranged up to $2.88 for Gallo brown rice in Tia Express. The
majority of brands fall under 00000, the highest retail grade. White milled 00000
ranged in price from $1.05 to $1.99. Arroz Gallo, the nation’s largest seller, sold for
$1.39 in Tia Express and $1.99 in Carrefour. Double Carolina carried a premium
over white milled with prices ranging from $1.15 to $2.49. Lower grade 0000 white
milled sold for $0.75. Brown rice was the most expensive, up to $2.88 in Tia
Express.
In Montevideo prices were collected from Disco, the largest chain of supermar-
kets in Uruguay, and Tienda Inglesa, an upscale chain store. Uruguayan rice is equal
to or superior to Argentinean rice in quality but lacks the sophisticated packaging and
high prices. There is less brand name selection than in Argentina and Brazil. Various
rices from SAMAN and COOPAR accounted for virtually all of the shelf space. White
milled rice prices ranged from $0.82 to $0.95. The largest seller, COOPAR’s Blue
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Patna (Blue Belle or similar variety) sold for $0.93 in both locations. Its major
competitor, SAMAN’s Patna, sold for $0.83 in Disco and $0.85 in Tienda Inglesa.
The price for parboiled rice does not appear to be significantly different from the
price of white milled rice. SAMAN’s brown rice was priced $0.08 and $0.10 under
the price of its white milled rice.
MERCOSUR RICE TRADE
MERCOSUR rice trade is complex, taking place on three levels. First, there are
internal flows of rice from surplus to deficit areas within each of the three countries.
Internal flows are the most complex in Brazil. Second, there are flows of rice among
the three nations, primarily from Argentina and Uruguay to Brazil. Third, Argentina
and Uruguay export rice to non-MERCOSUR nations, and Brazil imports rice from
non-MERCOSUR nations. Although Argentinean rice exports have increased, they
are substantially less important than wheat, corn, soybean and beef exports. Uru-
guayan rice exports, estimated at $165 million for the 1995/96 marketing year, have
the third highest export sales after meat and wool. In addition to being complex, the
MERCOSUR rice trade is also dynamic. In the 1990’s, Brazilian imports and
Argentinean and Uruguayan exports have increased dramatically.
Internal Flows
In Brazil, the southern region accounts for nearly half of total domestic produc-
tion. The other four regions have similar production levels but are lower than that of
the southern region. About 71% of the population, but only 29% of the national area,










Parboiled Blue Patna 0.88 0.95
Blue Patna ‘Blue Belle’ 0.93 0.93
Blue Patna Parboiled Boiled-in-Bag 1.89
Blue Patna Boiled-in-Bag 1.93 1.94
OTHER
Arroz Patna - La Olmorena 0.82
aPrice at time price was collected
bMilled long grain white except where noted
Source: the authors.
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is located in the northeastern and southeastern regions along the Atlantic coast. The
three largest urban centers, Saõ Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte, are
located in the southeast. Together, these two regions have an estimated rough rice
deficit of about 5.4 million MT. The southeast alone accounts for about 70% of this
deficit. The northern region is roughly self-sufficient in rice, the west-central region
has a surplus of 0.5 million MT of upland rice, and the southern region a surplus of
2.7 million MT of largely irrigated rice. Current west-central surpluses are down from
1.2 to 1.5 million MT in the 1980’s due to lower production levels in the states of
Goias and Mato Grosso. Increases in irrigated production in Rio Grande do Sul have
only partially offset the decline in upland production.
Most of the west-central region’s 0.5 million-MT surplus is shipped to the north-
east due to its low income levels and traditional consumption of upland rice. The
northeastern region is the largest market for low-quality rice, i.e, upland rice and
irrigated rice with a high percentage of brokens. The primary market for the south’s
irrigated surplus is the urban centers of the southeast.
With lower per-capita rice consumption, smaller, more concentrated populations
and production concentrated in a single contiguous area, Argentina and Uruguay have
relatively simple internal rice flows. Argentina consumes nearly 400,000 MT of rough
rice annually. About 70% of consumption is concentrated along the Rio de la Plata
and Paraná rivers (the Littoral) in the states of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Cordoba,
Entre Rios and Corrientes. The bulk of domestically consumed rice (Blue Belle variet-
ies and Double Carolina) is from Entre Rios and Santa Fe. The two states are within
easy reach of consumption areas in the Littoral. Corrientes primarily produces long-
grain tropical indica varieties for the Brazilian market.
Uruguay, with the smallest national area (about the size of North Dakota), rela-
tively flat topography and 50% of its population in the capital city of Montevideo, has
the simplest internal logistics. Uruguay consumes only about 75,000 MT of rough rice
annually, and all points within Uruguay are no more than 4 to 5 hours by truck from
rice production areas. Rice intended for the domestic market (Blue Belle and similar
varieties) is largely produced in the eastern departments. The northern and north-
central departments primarily produce long-grain tropical indica varieties for the Bra-
zilian market.
Intra-MERCOSUR Trade
Intra-MERCOSUR rice trade is relatively simple. Of the six possible directions of
trade among the three countries, only two are important: Argentinean and Uruguayan
exports to Brazil9. Brazilian imports of Argentinean and Uruguayan rice has increased
from about 230,000 MT of milled rice in 1989 to about 700,000 MT in 1994 (Table
9Argentina and Uruguay also export to Chile and Paraguay. However, in comparison to Brazil, these markets
are relatively unimportant.
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16). In 1995, this number fell to 638,000 MT. In 1996, intra-MERCOSUR trade
should expand as Uruguay ships a higher percentage of its total exports to Brazil.
Due to its small domestic needs, Uruguay has traditionally been the main
MERCOSUR supplier to Brazil. However, Argentinean exports have increased mark-
edly in the 1990’s, and in 1995/96 Argentina became the number one foreign
supplier to the Brazilian market. This was aided by Uruguay’s success in diversifying
its export markets. In the previous two marketing years, Uruguay shipped between 75
and 80% of total exports to Brazil. In 1995/96 this number was down to 52%
because Uruguay made large sales to Iran, Peru and Senegal10. In 1989 Argentina
exported only 39,000 MT to Brazil, but this grew to 345,000 MT in 1995. Argentina’s
and Uruguay’s exports to Brazil should continue to grow as their area expands. Their
large market share is aided by the tariff on non-MERCOSUR rice imports, which is
currently 20% (up from 10% in the spring of 1995). In addition, except for northeast-
ern markets, non-MERCOSUR Brazilian imports cannot be financed with extended
credit. Argentina’s and Uruguay’s future role in the Brazilian market, however, is
dependent on their ability to diversify their export markets — an important priority of
both nations.
The bulk of intra-MERCOSUR rice trade is mill to mill. Middle men are usually
unnecessary due to the close physical proximity of the production areas in the three
countries and the small quantities involved in a typical transaction. The importing and
exporting mill are typically the same size. Because most sales are on a cash-and-carry
basis, financial institutions seldom become involved.
The lack of uniform MERCOSUR-wide customs procedures, in effect acting as a
non-tariff barrier, is a major problem. This has resulted in delayed imports of rice into
Brazil (up to 20 days), which have been the most severe at the Brazil-Argentina
Table 16. Brazilian imports of milled rice by country.
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
------------------------------000’s MT------------------------------
Uruguay 193 357 384 343 511 452
Argentina 39 78 124 232 344 250
United States 2 101 330 12 6 203
Vietnam - - 224 20 69 200
Thailand - 17 131 - 14 13
Indonesia - - - - 36 138
Pakistan - - 25 30 - 1
Taiwan - - - - - 45
Total 233 553 1218 637 980 1303
Source: Sparks America del Sur.
10From January through August 1996, Uruguay had exported 358,168 MT of rice. About 73.5% or 263,123
had been shipped to Brazil.
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border in Uruguayana. While the Argentinean rice industry claims that these delays
are due to pressure from the Brazilian rice industry, the Brazilians attribute the delays
to transportation problems. The Argentineans have conceded that this problem is
slowly improving. Both sides agree that uniform customs procedures should substan-
tially reduce this problem.
Traditionally, Argentinean and Uruguayan mills have not tried to distribute con-
sumer-packaged rice under their own brand names in Brazil. Recently, however, more
Argentinean and Uruguayan consumer-packaged brand-name rice has reached Brazil-
ian consumers through joint ventures and exclusive distribution rights. SAMAN, an
Uruguayan mill, sells rice under its brand name in Brazil and has set up a distribution
system to facilitate this. This is aided by Uruguay’s regional reputation for high-quality
rice.
External MERCOSUR Trade
External MERCOSUR rice trade consists of Brazilian imports from, and Argentinean
and Uruguayan exports to, non-MERCOSUR nations. Brazilian imports from non-
MERCOSUR nations have been growing but are highly variable (Table 16). The
United States and Vietnam are the principal non-MERCOSUR suppliers. The consis-
tency of Argentinean and Uruguayan exports and the variability of non-MERCOSUR
imports would appear to indicate that non-MERCOSUR exporters are Brazil’s residual
suppliers, supplying what Argentina and Uruguay are unable to supply.
Although Brazil is the primary export market, an important goal of both Argen-
tina and Uruguay is market diversification. Based on data in Tables 17 and 18, non-
Brazilian markets account for only about 20% of their exports. Uruguay has a longer
history of exporting to non-Brazilian markets and in this area is more sophisticated
than Argentina. As noted earlier, Uruguay was successful in reducing exports to Brazil
from 80% of the total in 1994 to only 52% in 1995. However, it is expected that this
number will increase in 1996. There is no indication that Argentina is diversifying
away from the Brazilian market. Uniformity of quality still hinders the ability of
Argentina to make large sales in high-quality non-Brazilian markets.
Several factors indicate that the 1996/97 and 1997/98 marketing years should
see strong sales to Brazil from both MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR exporters.
Due to reduced production (see page 16) Brazil is expected to have a 2 million-MT
(milled basis) shortfall in the 1996/97 marketing year. In 1996, Argentina is expected
to supply only slightly more than the 345,000 MT that it supplied in 1995. If
Uruguay increases its shipments to Brazil as expected, then total MERCOSUR ship-
ments to Brazil for 1996/97 should be about 730,000 MT — less than one-third of
Brazil’s import needs. This would indicate that non-MERCOSUR imports at about
1.35 million MT will account for the bulk of imports. Under normal growing condi-
tions, Brazil’s imports for 1997/98 should exceed 1996/97 imports. High Brazilian
import needs may result in a reduction in the MERCOSUR tariff from 20 to 10% and
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Table 17. Argentinean exports of rice by country.
Country 1992 1994 1995
--------------------------------MT-------------------------------
Angola - - 4166
Chad - - 7071
Bolivia 18327 6444 5079
Senegal - - 5729
Brazil 225734 168070 314581
Colombia - - 300
Costa Rica 73 2 70
Chile 19088 12871 28184
Ecuador - 18 14
Jamaica - 235 -
Haiti - - 12176
Mexico - 17703 -
Netherlands - - 1400
Paraguay 5572 9662 10569
Peru 5038 - 18
Uruguay 24 76 77
Spain 90 - 194
Portugal 2549 - -
Israel 964 - -
South Africa - - 13490
Total 277459 215081 403118
Source: MERCOARROZ (April 16, 1996).
the lifting of the ban on extended financing in non-northeastern markets. Although
the drought played a major role in reduced Brazilian production in 1995/96, reduc-
tions in planted areas are a likely long-term possibility; consumer tastes continue to
shift away from upland rice, Brazil’s irrigated rice production costs remain high in
comparison to Argentina and Uruguay and lack of production credit remains a
problem. It would appear that current high world prices and strong Brazilian demand
will increase plantings in Argentina and Uruguay in 1996/97 and beyond. It is likely
that the rice area in Argentina will continue to grow at a 5 to 10% rate for the
remainder of the decade. Future export opportunities for non-MERCOSUR nations
will depend on the size of production shortfalls in Brazil as well as exportable sur-
pluses in Argentina and Uruguay.
Most non-MERCOSUR rice is imported by Brazilian distributors. Distributors buy,
package and market milled rice, frequently contracting with supermarket chains to
provide private label rice. They perform no milling functions. Most distributors import
non-MERCOSUR rice through brokers, lacking the sophistication or size to import
directly. Distributors have only been important since 1990 when Brazil lowered its
tariff on non-MERCOSUR rice from 40 to 10% and on MERCOSUR rice to 0%.
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Distributors are primarily located in the large urban centers of the southeast. One of
the strengths of distributors, and for which they have been criticized by millers, is their
flexibility in procuring rice. Distributors may purchase milled rice from domestic mills
or import from a number of sources. Imported rice is desirable because it avoids high
Brazilian milling costs. Another option is to import rough rice and have it custom
milled. Distributors have been criticized for blending any number of combinations of
upland, domestic irrigated and imported rice. As a rule, an upland/irrigated blend can
contain no more than 25% of upland rice before its taste becomes apparent. One
problem with blending, of course, is that cooking times may vary among the compo-
nent rices. Distributors and their allies, the supermarket chains, want to import rice
freely in order to take advantage of subsidies and the favorable credit terms offered by
non-MERCOSUR suppliers.
There are tradeoffs in the sourcing of Brazilian imports. MERCOSUR rice pro-
ducers are the main beneficiaries when a high rice tariff prevails through the trade
creation effect of a custom union. The MERCOSUR rice industry claims that they
need a 35% external tariff to protect themselves from “subsidized” imports. A private
Table 18. Uruguayan exports of milled rice by country by marketing year (MT).a
Country 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Angola - - - - - 1127
Argentina - - - - - 3120
Bahamas - - 86 280 322 -
Brazil 234540 253801 294339 360424 321116 343080
Chile 4007 5437 12648 11973 15266 10734
Cyprus 1017 948 1349 1116 1010 1247
Spain - 378 634 236 237 1696
Haiti - - - 5157 10370 -
Netherlands 6223 - 4074 - - -
Iran - - 24945 - - 39562
Canary Is. 473 1044 1727 1569 1586 228
Kuwait 300 200 300 213 380 40
Malta - - 108 112 22 108
Mexico 520 - 9700 15265 24156 3350
Paraguay - - - 8 - 36
Peru - - 40131 67997 10828 73228
Greece - - - - - 194
Portugal 599 - 43 11736 323 258
South Africa 638
Senegal - - - - 12079 50898
Slovenia - - - - - 215
Sweden 400 37 65 43 65 -
Japan 51
Others 1525 5842 1404 3881 5622 866
Total 249604 267687 391553 480010 403472 528944
aMarketing year is April 1 through March 31.
Source: Comision Sectorial del Arroz.
THE MERCOSUR RICE ECONOMY
43
Buenos Aires commodity analysis firm estimates that a 25% tariff is needed. A high
external tariff, however, may not be desirable for Brazil’s low-income consumers and
rice distributors. Distributors desire easy access to low-cost imports for use as a
bargaining tool with large MERCOSUR mills from Rio Grande do Sul, Argentina and
Uruguay.
POLICY
Government intervention in the rice economies of the region varies but has
generally declined, consistent with recent domestic reforms (see Table 19 for a
summary of policy instruments). Although Brazil has the largest number of policy
instruments in place, their effect has declined due to budgetary restrictions. Argentina
has revoked most of its traditional policy instruments and currently has a rice economy
largely driven by market forces. In Uruguay, the major policy instrument is an annual
average producer price (akin to the pooled price of the Canadian Wheat Board),
which is determined by a consortium of producer, miller and government interest
groups.
Brazil
The Brazilian government began to directly intervene in agriculture during World
War I when it established a minimum producer price for beans and wheat and created
the Executive Delegation of National Production to improve transportation and supply
agricultural production inputs. The Production Finance Commission (CFP), under the
Ministry of Finance, was later established in 1943 to supply producer credit. The CFP
would be moved a number of times in a search to obtain the agency that could best
fund it. The CFP was moved in 1962 to the National Superintendency of Supply
Table 19. Summary of MERCOSUR rice policy instruments, 1996.








Import tariffs 0% Mercosur 0% Mercosur 0% Mercosur
20% non- 20% non- 20% non-
Mercosur Mercosur Mercosur
Tax rebate $0.38/50kg
Significant non-tariff barriers High port costs
No long-term financing
on imports except in
Northeast
Source: The authors.
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(SUNAB), whose mission was to administer agricultural prices, because of an agricul-
tural supply crisis. From 1967 to 1990, the CFP was under the direct control of the
Ministry of Agriculture. In 1990, the CFP was placed under the direction of the CNA,
or what a short time later would become CONAB (Companhia Nacional de
Abasticimento or The National Supply Company), which administers the agricultural
price support program. In 1991 CONAB was placed under the control of the Ministry
of Agriculture.
The first producer price support program was established in July 1945 for rice,
beans, peanuts and sunflower seeds. The program was financed by the Banco do
Brasil and administered by the CFP. Minimum prices were to be based on “effective”
costs plus a 30% markup and the expected tendency of the market. Although the
purpose of the program was to support producer prices, until the 1980’s the pro-
gram was largely dedicated to estimating production costs, which were used as the
main criteria in establishing credit levels. Under the CFP loan program, a producer
could obtain financing of up to 80% of expected income based on the minimum price.
The minimum price was fixed three months before planting, although this provision
was frequently violated. CFP loans could be repaid in kind at the minimum price.
Product accumulated under the program was placed in a strategic reserve. Accumula-
tion in excess of the strategic reserve was exported. The minimum price was initially
offered only to producers, especially small producers who traditionally relied on local
moneylenders for production loans. However, after much lobbying, millers and other
marketers obtained the right to receive the minimum price, provided that they could
demonstrate that the producer of the rice had received the minimum price.
By 1979, the rural credit and subsidized input paradigm was exhausted and
highly criticized by those outside of agriculture. In 1980 greater emphasis was placed
on the price support program. Under the price support program, market prices were
supported by purchasing rice when the Saõ Paulo wholesale price dipped below the
minimum price for 10 consecutive days. When the Saõ Paulo wholesale price ex-
ceeded a 60-month running average trigger price (PLE), stocks were released. Later, a
system based on regional wholesale prices was implemented. The PLE program also
called for imports when domestic supplies were low, prices were accelerating or sales
of government-held stocks could not dampen prices.
The goal of the price support program was to stabilize the market price. Govern-
ment rationale for the program was 1) to maintain price parity between the agricul-
tural and non-agricultural sectors, 2) to cover increasing production costs, 3) to set a
stable long-run equilibrium price and 4) to provide a subsidy in order to increase
production. Stocks accumulated under the price support program went to strategic
reserves (which were designed to hold 1/12 of annual consumption) and to regulate
the market. Due to Brazil’s inflationary problems, the support and trigger prices and
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interest on CFP loans were indexed. The support price, however, was not indexed.
Only after several poor harvests was the support price indexed.
In reality, support price levels were usually set well below market prices due to
budgetary constraints, so that in effect, the program had little influence on market
prices. Support levels did not cover total costs and seldom gave the producer a 30%
markup over cash costs.
CFP credit, about 25% of which went to rice producers, declined throughout the
1980s. By the early 1990s, CFP’s budget for loans had fallen to 25% of its 1979 high
of nearly $28 billion (see Fig. 7). Similar to credit, real support levels for irrigated rice
declined sharply from 1987 to 1994 (Fig. 8). Average support prices (in constant
1994 reals) were 16.11 reals (one real is equal to one dollar) per 50-kg bag of rough
rice from 1975 to 1986, but fell sharply to 8.04 reals (in 1994 constant reals) from
1987 to 1994. Similarly, Fig. 9 shows sharp drops in the per-hectare estimated
production costs upon which the minimum price is based. In spite of falling support
levels, government purchases became significant in the second half of the 1980s even
in consumption-deficit states such as Saõ Paulo (see Table 20). It has been estimated
that price supports increased rice prices 12% above the free market price in this
period (Auxiliadora). The program was most effective in the central-west agricultural
frontier where the government was typically the only buyer.
Fig. 7. Brazilian government credit to agriculture. Source: FEDARROZ.
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Fig. 8. Support prices for Brazilian irrigated rought rice. (Source: FEDARROZ)
Fig. 9. Estimated government production costs on which loans are based (assumes 4.2
to 5.0 MT/ha yields). (Source: FEDARROZ)
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The price support and credit programs have had conflicting purposes. The
official purpose of the programs was the long-term expansion and development of
agriculture; in practice, however, they were used as short-term policies to manage
immediate problems caused by unexpected shifts in supply and demand, i.e., crisis
management. Macroeconomic and cheap food policies, in effect, controlled price
support levels. As a macroeconomic crisis management tool, agricultural policy came
to be used to insure adequate supplies of commodities at low prices rather than a
policy to encourage production.
Because of its use as a short-term “crisis-solver,” the price support program had
several adverse effects. A major effect was the withdrawal of the private sector from
many marketing functions, leaving only the public sector and speculators in the
market, due to “institutional risk” (sharp changes in program provisions from year to
year). For example, the storage function of the program largely drove out private
storage firms, leaving the main storage responsibility to the government.
In the 1990’s rice policy has become more market oriented. Liberalization of
grain imports in 1990 shifted many of the government’s former responsibilities to co-
operatives, private millers, the financial community and brokers. The government has
also reduced its ownership of storage facilities and has moved toward contracting with
private firms for storage.
Table 20. Brazilian production and government acquisitions of rice, by year, 1969-91.
Year Production (MT) Acquisitions (MT) % of Production
1969 6394285 9175 0.1
1970 7553083 517800 6.9
1971 6593179 14122 0.2
1972 7824231 0 0.0
1973 7160127 12162 0.2
1974 6764038 6548 0.1
1975 7781538 3115 0.0
1976 9757079 649302 6.7
1977 8893696 1195241 13.4
1978 7296142 156076 2.1
1979 7595214 110871 1.5
1980 9775720 221868 2.3
1981 8228326 800040 9.7
1982 9734553 733343 7.5
1983 7741753 501142 6.5
1984 9027363 664534 7.4
1985 9024555 1499190 16.6
1986 10374030 1729640 16.7
1987 10578000 2837277 26.8
1988 11672200 2266130 19.3
1989 11092000 890073 8.0
1990 7967600 92042 1.2
1991 9996800 817 0.0
Source: Auxiliadora de Carvalho, 1994.
ARKANSAS EXPERIMENT STATION BULLETIN 954
48
Currently, Brazil has minimum guaranteed producer prices (MGP) for rice and six
other commodities that are based on the cost of production. Agricultural programs
are announced in August for the summer crops and in March for the winter crops
(seasons inverted in southern hemisphere). The government has mostly switched from
direct purchase to marketing loans, so it now uses the MGP more as a loan rate and
less as a purchase price. There are two types of marketing loan contracts: 1) con-
tracts in which the government agrees to purchase the product at the minimum
support price (EGF/SOV) and 2), due to budget constraints, contracts in which the
government has the option to purchase the commodity at the minimum support price
or to sell the product at the market price (EGF/COV). The majority of marketing
loans are of the EGF/COV type. Before July 1, 1994, the support price was adjusted
every 15 days beginning at harvest. Since July 1, 1994, however, the support price
for irrigated rice has been frozen at $11.93/50 kg. The current support price for
upland rice is $10.54/60 kg in the south, southeast, central-south and central-west;
$10.17 in Tocantins and Mato Grosso; and $9.60 in the north.
Certain components of the credit programs vary from year to year, but loan
terms are generally differentiated by farm size, crop, yield and region. In 1994/95,
production and marketing loans for the winter crops (wheat, barley, canola and oats)
and the summer crops (rice, corn, cotton, soybeans, etc.) totaled $6.5 billion, a 12%
increase from the previous year but well below the record of $28 billion of 1979/80.
Direct government production loans to producers are declining, as are the loan limits
per farm. In the past, interest rates were indexed to the rate of inflation. During the
1995/96 crop year, the interest rate is a fixed 16%.
Because of the farm crisis of 1995/96, the government and the producers
renegotiated some $7 billion of farm debt that will have to be repaid in the next 7-10
years with a one or two-year grace period at a 3% annual interest rate.
Farmers can also obtain private sector loans through the use of commodity
certificates (CM-G) and bonds (CPR). There are two kinds of CM-G. The CMDG is
used when the product is delivered and paid for in cash (a cash or spot transaction).
The CMFG is used for a futures contract. Both are guaranteed by a bank. The CM-
G’s are freely negotiable in the market based on the quantity, quality, place and date
of delivery. The certificates are issued by the producer, the lender, or a co-operative
and are administered by the Center of Registrations S.A. The CPR’s (bonds) are
issued by the farms and co-operatives when the farms sell their agricultural products
in advance to finance production. The CPR’s are administered by a network of offices
authorized by the Banco do Brasil.
Due to ongoing programs, the government is still the largest holder of rice
stocks. In May 1996 CONAB estimated that 2 million MT of rice were in government
contract storage facilities (MERCOARROZ, May 30, 1996). Maintaining the quality of
rice in government storage is a major problem. In 1993 and 1994, rice worth several
million dollars was ruined due to inadequate storage facilities. As a result of this, the
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government instituted mandatory measures to monitor government stocks stored in
private facilities.
Tax policies have perhaps had the largest impact on the Brazilian rice economy.
Brazilian taxes are high and regressive and lack uniformity across states and economic
sectors. There are over 60 separate taxes. A major goal of the Cardoso administra-
tion is to simplify the current tax code. Agriculture pays a disproportionately higher
level of taxes than manufacturing. About one-third of the value of the market basket
of basic foods is composed of taxes. Fochezatto and Mattuella (1995) have estimated
that 42% of the retail price of rice is composed of taxes (see Tables 21 and 22). As a
result, many business decisions are based on their tax consequences, e.g., millers ship
rough rice out of Rio Grande do Sul to mill in other states in order to avoid high state
milling taxes.
 Brazil has several policies that primarily affect non-MERCOSUR rice imports.
After February 28, 1995, all rice imports to Brazil were payable in cash only. Imports
to the northeast were excluded from this policy. This measure was intended to
exclude imported rice, which is viewed as having an unfair advantage by the
MERCOSUR rice industry, which cannot offer liberal payment terms. Another policy
that restricts non-MERCOSUR imports is the application of a 25% Merchant Marine
tax on the freight rates of all imports outside the MERCOSUR. Brazil also has anti-
subsidy policies that can be used to counter the effects of subsidized imports.
Argentina
 From the end of World War II until the early 1990’s, Argentina followed a
systematic anti-rural policy in which rural infrastructure was neglected and agricultural
exports were taxed in order to support macroeconomic and industrial import-substitu-
tion policies. Export taxes on agricultural commodities were as high as 25% of the
world price and accounted for as much as 20% of government revenues. The agricul-
tural sector was further taxed through a perpetually overvalued peso. The government
regulated internal rice prices and exports through the Junta de Granos (National
Grain Board). This forced the agricultural sector, which is highly export dependent, to
become highly competitive by keeping capital investment and variable costs to a
minimum.
Since the early 1990’s, the Junta de Granos has been privatized, export taxes
have been rescinded, the peso has been closely tied to the dollar, and both federal
and provincial concessionary credit is no longer available. Tax levels, although much
lower than in Brazil, are still relatively high and include fuel taxes, public utility service
taxes and value added taxes, as well as taxes on other forms of consumption. In 1992
the government began a tax rebate program on exported rice, which is the only
government program that is a direct subsidy to the rice industry. This amounted to
about 2.5% of FOB value. On March 1, 1995, however, this program was discontin-
ued.
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Table 21. Brazilian rice costs and taxes per 30 kgs of milled rice, 1995
Rio Grande do Sula Rio de Janeirob
Marketing Level Total Cost Tax Total Cost Tax
Production 7.73 1.94 7.74 1.95
Transport to Mill 0.47 0.20 0.47 0.20
Milling 5.91 2.59 6.16 2.84
Distribution 0.32 0.13 1.61c 0.67
Retailing 1.96 1.35 - -
Total (U.S.$) 16.38 6.21 15.98 5.65
aPrice includes 7% ICMS.
bWholesale price with 12% ICMS.
cTransport from Rio Grande do Sul to Sao Paulo.
Source: Fochezatto and Mattuella, 1995.
Table 22. Breakdown of Rio Grande do Sul Consumer rice price
with and without taxes, by marketing level, 1995.
Stages with Taxes % Taxes Total Taxes without Taxes
$/MT -------------$/MT-------------
Production 257.94 25.17 64.92 193.02
Transport to mill 15.66 41.60 6.51 9.15
Mill rough rice price 128.20 21.78 27.92 100.28
Mill costs 23.54 42.00 9.89 13.65
Mill profits 23.54 42.00 9.89 13.65
ICMS 7% 32.96 100.00 32.96 0.00
COFINS 2% 9.41 100.00 9.41 0.00
PIS 0.65% 3.06 100.00 3.06 0.00
FOB mill price 470.77 32.85 154.67 316.10
Transport to retail 10.65 41.60 5.25 5.39
Delivered wholesale price 481.42 33.08 159.93 321.49
Retail costs 7.16 35.26 2.52 4.64
Fiscal credit 32.96 100.00 32.96 0.00
Retail profit 26.69 42.00 11.21 15.48
ICMS 7% 37.37 100.00 37.37 0.00
COFINS 2% 10.68 100.00 10.68 0.00
PIS 0.65% 3.47 100.00 3.47 0.00
Consumer price 533.83 36.17 192.22 341.61
Consumer price per kg 0.53 36.17 0.19 0.34
Source: Fochezatto and Mattuella, 1995.
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Uruguay
Uruguay is unique in its institutional arrangements in that the millers, producers
and government are represented in a commission that represents the interests of the
rice industry. The Gremial de Molinos Arroceros (Rice Millers Association), founded in
1950, represents the interests of the rice millers. Initially, its executive committee was
responsible for setting producer prices based on production costs. The Asociación
Cultivadores de Arroz (Rice Growers Association), founded in 1947, represents the
interests of rice producers. Beginning with 40 members, the Association currently
represent about 95% of the 750 producers in the country. The Association is sup-
ported by a 0.27% tax levied on the sales of its members. Its functions are 1) to work
with government and the milling industry to make policy decisions affecting the rice
industry, 2) to develop and maintain a system of rice testing labs in order to crosscheck
quality testing performed by mills and to promote quality improvement among pro-
ducers, 3) to obtain the lowest cost production loans from the Banco de la Republica
for its members, 4) to provide hail insurance and improved seed to producers who
have no financing/marketing contracts and 5) to represent producer interests in the
Sectorial Rice Commission. The Association does not provide specific extension or
support service but occasionally sponsors “jornadas de campo” or field days. A future
Association goal is to provide managerial support services to its members. The
Association has very close relations with the Rice Millers Association with whom it
works to resolve issues of common concern. In 1980 when the National Agricultural
Research Institute (INIA) became quasi-privatized, the Association pledged $7 million
for its support.
The Comision Sectorial de Arroz (Sectoral Rice Commission) initially started as
the Comision Honoraria de Promoción Arrocera (Honorary Rice Promotion Commis-
sion), which was created by the president in 1962 when rice production and milling
was declared to be in the national interest. In 1973 the name of the commission was
changed to Comision Sectorial del Arroz, and the commission was made a dependent
of the Secretary of Planning and Budget. The Commission is composed of represen-
tatives from the Rice Millers Association, the Producer Association, the Banco de la
Republica and the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. The main pur-
pose of the Commission is to act as a forum for the various rice industry interest
groups and to establish the seasonal average national producer price. The seasonal
average producer price is based on production costs and market prices. This price is
applicable to producers who have signed marketing agreements with mills, about 90
to 95% of production. After the harvest is completed in May, a provisional price is
announced in June based on expected market conditions. In February of the following
year, a final price is announced based on actual sales. One result of the negotiated
price is that mill competition for rough rice deliveries is based on non-price criteria
such as location and the prices of rental land and water, if provided. This system is
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most dominant in the eastern production zone. Producers in the north and north-
central production areas (many of them Brazilian) are less likely to be a part of this
system.
In addition to the average seasonal price, the marketing contract between millers
and producers typically stipulates that the mill is to provide the producer with a 180-
day production loan. Financing is provided by the Banco de la Republica but is
guaranteed by the mill. The Banco de la Republica is a government bank that lends at
market interest rates to the private sector. After harvest the account is closed, and the
mill pays the loan and debits the producer’s account.
Since 1980, Uruguay has had a tax rebate program on rice exports. In 1994 the
rebate was set at $0.38/50 kg of milled rice. The rebate has been as high as $1.44.
Rebate levels are set according to political and market conditions and budgetary
considerations.
RESEARCH
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay have sophisticated national rice research pro-
grams. In Brazil, the state of Rio Grande do Sul is responsible for much of the
irrigated rice research. Currently, the research programs in Uruguay and Rio Grande
do Sul are largely producer supported. Historically, the role of these programs was to
increase yields and lower costs and to adapt seed and production practices to local
soil types and climatic conditions. Seed stocks have come from the United States and
CGIAR (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) Institutions.
Brazil
Brazilian rice research is primarily conducted by two public institutions, Empresa
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria (Brazilian Institute for Agricultural Research) or
EMBRAPA and the Instituto Rio Grandense do Arroz (The Rio Grande do Sul Rice
Institute) or IRGA. EMBRAPA, an arm of the Ministry of Agriculture, is responsible
for coordinating the co-operative agricultural research system, which employs 2100
research scientists in 40 field units and administers an annual budget of approximately
$200 million. EMBRAPA is wholly funded by the federal government. The main goal
of EMBRAPA is to generate and promote scientifically and technologically based
production with an emphasis on sustainability, the well-being of Brazilian society, the
rational use of national resources and environmental protection (EMBRAPA, un-
dated). EMBRAPA tests technology from other parts of the world for its appropriate-
ness in Brazil and transfers generated technology to other developing nations, espe-
cially to Latin America and Africa.
EMBRAPA’s upland rice research is conducted by the Centro Nacional de Pesquisa
de Arroz e Feijao (National Center for Rice and Bean Research) in the west-central
state of Goias, and its irrigated rice research is conducted by the Centro de Pesquisa
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Agropecuaria de Clima Temperado (Temperate Climate Agricultural Research Center)
in Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul.
IRGA is the rice research arm of the state of Rio Grande do Sul and was the first
institution to offer technical assistance to the industry. IRGA has 36 extension teams
distributed throughout the rice production areas, covering 106 municipalities. Re-
search is conducted in its five regional research centers. IRGA is supported by
producers through a checkoff system in which 0.12% of producer receipts go to
IRGA. The main goals of IRGA are to develop appropriate technologies for the
state’s irrigated rice industry, to provide technical assistance and extension, to gener-
ate rice situation and outlook reports and to store CONAB stocks. Specific research
goals are to increase production efficiency, modernize production systems, train tech-
nical personnel, develop a production data base, conduct joint studies with the co-
operative sector, produce 500 MT of improved rice seed, improve soil analysis
capabilities and the technological levels of their research equipment and develop
improved irrigation and drainage systems. Current research projects include develop-
ing cultivars that have a shorter growing period, are resistant to cold and disease,
need less water, are shorter in stature and have better milling characteristics. Much of
IRGA’s research has been focused on releasing high-yielding tropical cultivars appro-
priate for the temperate climate of Rio Grande do Sul. Plant material for these
varieties originated in the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) via the
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).
Argentina
Rice research is primarily performed by the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia
Agropecuaria (National Institute of Agricultural Technology), or INTA, which was
created in 1956, and a recently formed industry promotion group, the Comision Pro-
Mejoramiento del Cultivo de Arroz (Commission for the Improvement of Rice Cultiva-
tion), or Proarroz. INTA is the autonomous experiment station system of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (SAPyA). The INTA system consists of 42
experiment stations, 200 extension units and 13 research institutes. Research and
extension are integrated at the experiment station level. The experiment stations are
grouped into 15 regions. Experiment stations focus their research on agricultural
activities that have a major economic impact in their region. Prior to 1993 INTA was
supported by agricultural exports taxes. Currently, the system is supported by import
taxes.
INTA’s research and extension is intended: 1) to expand agricultural production
so as to improve both internal and external market supplies without detriment to
natural resources, 2) to diversify both domestic production and export markets geo-
graphically, 3) to place more emphasis on value-added products, 4) to promote
sustainable production systems, 5) to assure that the benefits of technological change
are accessible to all, particularly low-income sectors and 6) to improve the quality of
rural life (INTA, 1994).
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Rice research and extension in Argentina takes place at regional centers in Entre
Rios and Corrientes but is primarily conducted at the experiment station in Concepción
del Uruguay, Entre Rios. Research is directed toward seed improvement, improved
management practices, pest and disease control and screening rice varieties sent from
CIAT via IRRI for appropriateness in Argentinean production areas. INTA has re-
cently developed a higher-yielding American-type cultivar known as H144 or Don
Juan, which will be ready for commercial production for the 1995/96 crop year. The
rationale for Don Juan is to make American-type varieties higher yielding and thus
more competitive with tropical varieties. This should increase the supply of American-
type rice available for high quality markets, which is part of industry strategy to
diversify away from the Brazilian market.
Proarroz is a non-profit commission dedicated to serving the rice industry. The
38 members of Proarroz include representatives from private industry, co-operatives,
producer associations and the provincial government of Entre Rios. The mission of
Proarroz is 1) to conduct agronomic and economic research, 2) to disseminate infor-
mation to the rice industry, 3) to lobby on behalf of the rice industry, 4) to solve rice
industry problems and 5) to promote rice consumption (Proarroz, December, 1994).
Proarroz participates in agronomic research primarily by channeling funds to INTA
for specific projects of interest. Proarroz recently donated $50,000 to INTA to
perform research oriented toward genetic improvement; weed, insect and disease
control; crop rotation practices; and no-till planting.
Uruguay
The Instituto Nacional de Investigación Agropecuaria (INIA) is the primary agri-
cultural research institution and is composed of five national research stations. Rice
research began in the eastern research station, located in the eastern rice production
region (department of Treinta y Tres) in 1970 and continues today to be the primary
rice research institution. The eastern rice research station is staffed by 14 full-time
professionals. In addition, rice research is conducted at one other research station and
15 experimental sites scattered throughout the east, north and north-central produc-
tion regions. INIA’s funding comes from a 0.4% tax levied on producer sales, a
matching amount from the government and internal institutional revenues. INIA is
directed by a board composed of two members appointed by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and two producer representatives. INIA research goals include 1) improving the
efficient use of seeds and seeding density and the use of fertilizers and other inputs in
the three distinct production zones, 2) evaluating new seeding methods — direct
seeding or with reduced labor input and 3) estimating the costs of various production
systems.
Rice research is conducted under the Programa Nacional de Investigación en
Arroz (National Rice Research Program). The rice breeding program began in 1974.
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In addition to its research, INIA disseminates information to producers through its
jornadas de campo. A major goal of the program is to create new American-type
cultivars that are pest resistant, surpass Blue Belle in yields and can be planted late
without detriment to yields (short-cycle). INIA has recently bred two American-type
cultivars, Yerbal and Tacuari, which are already in commercial production. In the
1995/96 crop year these were planted on 15% of area and in 1996/97 are expected
to be planted on 30% of area. Yerbal and Tacuari are better tasting that IRGA
varieties but have higher yields than traditional Blue Belle varieties. It is anticipated
that these newer varieties will be planted in the eastern production areas, which are
more susceptible to cold. Tacuari seed is distributed by a consortium of nine seed
companies who control 90% of the market. Although these firms have exclusive rights
to the seed, they must provide the seed to all producers who want it. Royalties
received by INIA are plowed back into the rice program. Japonica cultivars that have
good production potential and can be marketed in alternative markets are also being
bred. Uruguay has been certified by the Japanese government to export to Japan.
Prior to field trials, all genetic improvement research is conducted in Treinta y
Tres. Field trials are conducted in the eastern, northern and north-central production
zones. INIA’s genetic base is obtained from the United States and CIAT. The most
promising genetic materials are planted in larger fields at the regional level by produc-
ers. The development of Yerbal and Tacuari has the same rationale as that for INTA’s
Don Juan: diversification of export markets.
SUMMARY
Due to recent reforms in domestic policies and regional integration, intra-regional
and extra-regional MERCOSUR rice trade has expanded rapidly in the 1990’s. Spe-
cifically, a decline in government support to the Brazilian rice sector has caused
import demand to grow to 1.4 million MT in 1995, 2 million MT in 1996 and more
than 2 million MT in 1997. The increase in Brazilian import demand, zero intra-
MERCOSUR tariffs and more favorable domestic agricultural policies have caused
production in Argentina and Uruguay to double since 1990. Argentina and Uruguay
have also increased their exports to non-MERCOSUR Latin America, Africa and the
Middle East. Argentina and Uruguay are expected to increasingly compete in high-
quality long-grain import markets currently dominated by the United States.
The above scenario has significantly impacted production to the detriment of
Brazil and to the benefit of Argentina and Uruguay. Changing consumer tastes, lower
support prices and credit levels and increasing competition from alternative crops
have caused Brazilian upland rice production to steadily decline since the mid-1980s.
Increasing Brazilian irrigated rice production, primarily in the state of Rio Grande do
Sul, made up for declines in the upland sector until recently. However, high producer
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debt levels in the industry and high production costs relative to contiguous production
areas in Argentina and Uruguay have caused a sharp decline in irrigated planted area
in 1995 and 1996. Numerous Rio Grande do Sul producers have ceased production
in Brazil and begun producing rice in lower cost areas of Argentina and Uruguay as a
result. Argentina has a large supply of low-cost, high-quality rice land, primarily in the
state of Corrientes. Industry members have estimated that Argentina could easily
triple its current area of 224,000 ha with proper irrigation infrastructure. In compari-
son to Argentina, Uruguay’s future increase in planted area will be more modest.
Currently, Argentina and Uruguay ship over 70% of their rice exports to Brazil,
although export diversification is a major goal of both nations. Most exports are in the
form of milled rice, although large farms, which are more likely to own drying
facilities, are exporting rough rice in an effort to expand the potential number of
buyers and increase revenues. Export sales are typically on a mill-to-mill basis, e.g., an
Uruguayan mill exports generic milled rice to an importing mill in Rio Grande do Sul.
The milling industry in both Argentina and Brazil has excess capacity and is undergo-
ing a downsizing trend. This should result in a smaller number of larger mills, which
should make Argentinean rice more competitive in non-MERCOSUR markets in the
future. Uruguay has only about 30 mills (in comparison to 105 in Argentina), which
typically operate at higher capacity levels than Argentinean and Brazilian mills.
Upland rice, which is produced only in Brazil, is locally consumed or else shipped
to the low-income areas of northeast Brazil. Upland rice is increasingly viewed as
inferior to irrigated rice by middle- and upper-income groups. High-yielding tropical
long-grain indica rice is the most important irrigated variety produced in the region.
Blue Belle and similar high-quality varieties are still produced in substantial quantities
in Argentina and Uruguay. Blue Belle price premiums, however, have not generally
compensated for their lower yields. There is also an important market for Double
Carolina in Argentina among high-income consumers.
Brazil is a high-volume, generally low-quality market. Although there are many
regional and local brands, large mills and distributors dominate urban markets. Dis-
tributors blend rice from both MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR suppliers, for
resale to retailers. The smaller Argentinean and Uruguayan retail markets are domi-
nated by a small number of domestic brands. Blue Belle and similar varieties dominate
Uruguay and Argentina retail sales. Argentinean consumers, especially in Buenos
Aires, are the most demanding with respect to quality. As a result, Argentinean retail
rice carries the highest prices, is more heavily advertised and has the most sophisti-
cated packaging.
A major marketing problem in the region is generally poor transportation. This is
due to lack of investment and maintenance at the national level and historically poor
integration between the transportation systems of the MERCOSUR nations. As a
result of under-utilized inland water transportation systems and lack of gauge unifor-
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mity and integration in the railroad system, most rice moves by truck. Improvement of
the transportation system is an important regional goal. In improving the MERCOSUR
transportation system, major emphasis will be placed on improving the Paraná-
Uruguay inland barge system, which should be a key factor in lowering the cost of
moving bulk commodities.
Brazil continues to support producers with minimum price and subsidized credit
programs; however, these programs lack effectiveness due to substantially reduced
budgets. Brazil also prohibits extended credit on rice imports on non-MERCOSUR
imports to all regions except the northeast. This credit policy is seen as an aid to the
MERCOSUR rice industry, which operates on a cash and carry basis due to high
financial costs. Argentina has no specific rice programs. Uruguay has a partial tax
rebate program, but the most important policy instrument is an average seasonal
producer price that is similar to the pooled price of the Canadian Wheat Board. A
commission composed of miller, producer and government representatives sets the
price. Possibly the most important regional policy is the external tariff on rice imports,
now set at 20%.
Existing rice research institutions are sophisticated and well-funded. Although
national governments continue to privatize, which has strong political backing in the
region, agricultural research continues to receive government funding. In Brazil and
Uruguay money from producer checkoff systems is an important source of funds for
rice research. An important component of Argentinean and Uruguayan rice research
programs is the development of higher-yielding Blue Belle varieties, which can match
tropical varieties in yield. Greater production of high-yielding Blue Belle varieties is
seen as a key to diversifying away from the Brazilian export market.
Argentinean and Uruguayan rice production and exports should continue to
expand rapidly over the next decade because of high international rice prices, produc-
tion cost arbitrage (which causes Brazilian producers to cease production in Rio
Grande do Sul and begin producing in Argentina and Uruguay) and declining milling
and transportation costs in relation to its major competitor for import markets, the
United States. Brazilian production, however, is likely to continue to contract in the
short-run as producer debt remains a problem, competition from competing crops
remain strong and Brazil continues to back away from producer support programs.
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